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Is it "The Will of the People"
or a Broken Arrow?
Collective Preferences, Out-of-the-Money
Options, Bush v. Gore, and Arguments for
Quashing Post-Balloting Litigation
Absent Specific Allegations of Fraud
MARK KLOCK*
The law school faculty was debating three proposed revisions to the
curriculum. Twenty of the thirty faculty present ranked proposal A pref-
erable to proposal B. Twenty ranked proposal B preferable to proposal
C. Twenty ranked proposal C preferable to proposal A. After countless
hours of debate without agreement the faculty finally reached a decision.
It decided thatany decisions made would be subject to change. Having
accomplished something positive, it moved on to debate the schedule for
discussing the changes to decisions yet to be made.
INTRODUCTION
It has now been over a year since the litigation involving the 2000
presidential election ended. An avalanche of emotional commentary has
subsided and given way to careful academic analysis. The University of
Chicago Law Review published a symposium on the decision with some
contributors claiming that heated emotions have cooled down.' But
* B.A., The Pennsylvania State University, 1978; Ph.D. in Economics, Boston College,
1983; J.D. (with honors), University of Maryland, 1988; Member D.C. and Maryland Bars;
Professor of Finance, The George Washington University. The author is a nonpartisan nonvoter.
1. Richard A. Epstein, "hi Such Manner as the Legislature Thereof May Direct": The
Outcome of Bush v. Gore Defended, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 613, 613 (2001) ("After a short flurry of
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have they really? Alan Dershowitz's book, Supreme Injustice, engaged
in admittedly ad hominem personal attacks on the five Republican Jus-
tices.2 Dershowitz not only opines that these five Justices illegally
decided the result to achieve their personal ends and then concocted a
legal justification-he claims to have compiled evidence that includes
motive to prove his case.3 The core of his evidence is his claim that
these five Justices would have decided the case differently if the parties'
positions had been reversed.4 That is obviously not a testable
hypothesis.'
Professor Dershowitz has a reputation for provocative and flamboy-
ant writing, and his book clearly displays strong rhetorical skills.6 Argu-
ing that he has compiled probative evidence to support his faith,
however, is as ludicrous as arguing that I have proof that the North Pole
lies at the bottom of the planet. The logical reasoning is a far larger
embarrassment to the legal profession than anything written by any of
the Justices in any of the proceedings involving the 2000 presidential
election .7
heated debate over the soundness of the decision, the nation buckled down to business as usual.
The attention of the media was, to say the least, short-lived.").
2. ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE: HOW THE HIGH COURT HIJACKED ELECTION
2000, at 110 (2001) ("The criticism I am making of' the majority justices includes a significant ad
hominem component. . . . I am also accusing them of dishonesty .. . . These criticisms are
directed at the justices personally .... ").
3. Professor Dershowitz repeatedly refers to the decision and motives with labels such as
lawless and improper and characterizes his arguments as based on proof and evidence. See, e.g.,
id. at 95 ("1 will demonstrate that by any reasonable standard of evaluation, the majority justices
[decided for Bush] because of malice aforethought.").
4. Id. at 12.
5. See generally Mark Klock, Finding Randon Coincidences While Searching for the Holy
Writ of Truth: Specification Searches in law and Public Policy or Cum Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc?,
2001 Wis. L. REV. 1007, 1018-22 (providing an explanation of hypothesis testing); Lee Epstein &
Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHi. L. REV. I (2002) (criticizing inferences in legal
scholarship).
6. See Murray B. Light, Dershowitz Shows Contenipt for Court, BUFF. NEws, Aug. 26, 2001,
at F4.
7. One of Professor Dershowitz's arguments is that it is morally wrong for academics to
defend the decision unless they honestly believe that the majority Justices would have voted the
other way if the candidates' positions were reversed. DERSHOWITz, supra note 2, at 108. It is not
obvious to me why his moral authority should supersede my religious beliefs. His position seems
a bit one-sided since it implies that someone who honestly believes that they have no way of
knowing what the Justices would have done in a different case, is morally wrong to defend the
decision but free to criticize without sin. I strongly suspect (but cannot prove) that Professor
Dershowitz fails his own test that he applies to the five Justices. I have in mind the case of N.Y.
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). This was the famous case in which the Court created
new constitutional law regarding the defamation of public officials to overturn the Supreme Court
of Alabama's affirmation of a defamation judgement for southern segregationists against the
Times. Id. at 256. Presumably, Professor Dershowitz supports the case since it affords him legal
protection for his otherwise defamatory book. My rhetorical question for Mr. Dershowitz then is,
how can one intellectually reconcile the blatantly contrived result in N.Y. Tines v. Sullivan with
[Vol. 57:1
2002] ARGUMENTS FOR QUASHING POST-BALLOTING LITIGATION 3
A detailed analysis of Dershowitz's book is far afield of the analy-
sis of this article. However, such an analysis provides some motivation
because it supports two of the three facts justifying this article. First, the
historical significance of the case means that analysis and commentary
will continue for years.8 Second, while much has been written already,
no one has previously applied the insights provided by the literature on
options to the policy arguments. Litigation has significant embedded
option components that were particularly acute in the context of the
2000 presidential election. An understanding of this is important for a
thorough analysis. Third, Dershowitz's claim that the five Justices sub-
stituted their political judgment for that of the people9 exemplifies a
fairly widespread ignorance of Professor Arrow's relatively well-known
Noble Prize-winning work proving that the conception of collective
judgment is a construct with internally flawed logic."'
What can option theory teach us about elections? Al Gore's posi-
tion from November 8th to December 12th with respect to the outcome
of the 2000 presidential election is perfectly analogous to an individual
with an out-of-the-money option when the person with the option exer-
cises some control over the riskiness of the underlying asset.I Posses-
sion of the ability to create and increase risk creates a moral hazard
problem for the individual with the out-of-the-money option. 2 It is
his criticism of the Court in Bush v. Gore given that "[tiwo partisan wrongs do not make a judicial
right"? DERSHOWITZ, supra note 2, at 8.
8. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 2, at 81 ("The majority per curiam opinion is likely to become
one of the most analyzed, criticized, and defended opinions in the history of the Supreme Court.").
9. Id. at 3.
10. See, e.g., Cheryl D. Block, Truth and Probability-Ironies in the Evolution of Social
Choice Theory, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 975, 975-81 (1998) (observing the pervasiveness of Professor
Arrow's proof that collective decisions cannot be made in such a manner that they will obey basic
principles of rationality).
1I. November 8, 2000, was the day after the election, at which time the first ballot count was
completed and showed Mr. Gore to have fewer votes than Mr. Bush. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S.
98, 100 (2000) (per curiam). Every subsequent ballot count led to the same result. See 5 Weeks of
History, USA TODAY, Dec. 14, 2000, at 3A, available at 2000 WL 5798249. On December 13,
2000, with his option to challenge effectively extinguished by the Supreme Court, Mr. Gore
finally conceded defeat. See John F. Harris & Ceci Connolly, Gore Offers Olive Branch and
Finality; Concession's Grace Notes May Decide His Future, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2000, at Al,
available at 2000 WL 29921521.
12. See, e.g., PHILIPPE JORION, VALUE AT RISK 43 (1997). Describing the relation between
moral hazard and risk when one exerts influence over the risk, Professor Jorion wrote:
This government guarantee is no panacea, for it creates a host of other problems,
generally described under the rubric of noral hazard. Given government
guarantees, there is even less incentive for depositors to monitor their banks, but
rather to flock to institutions offering high deposit rates. Bank owners are now
offered what is the equivalent of a "put" option. If they take risks and prosper, they
partake in the benefits. If they lose, the government steps in and pays back the
depositors. As long as the cost of deposit insurance is not related to the riskiness of
activities, there will be perverse incentives to take on additional risk.
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well-known that moral hazard creates economic inefficiency and that
rules that mitigate the moral hazard problem can improve the allocation
of social resources.13 This article seeks to explore the analogy between
the recent presidential election and financial options, and argues that as a
matter of public policy, vague and ambiguous statutes and case law
should be interpreted so as to destroy any option to challenge objective
election results on the basis of technology and ballot design ex post elec-
tion results.
The argument is further strengthened by the assertion that the pur-
pose of elections is not to determine the will of the people. Indeed, the
will of the people is an internally inconsistent, illogical construct that
serves no useful purpose outside of the mathematical proofs that it can-
not exist.' 4 Thus, it is argued that the purpose of elections is to provide
a socially acceptable method of allocating political power when there is
no consensus in order to end pointless and unresolvable debate so that
society can move on to other business.' 5 "[W]hat the people want can-
not be social policy simply because we do not and cannot know what the
people want."' 6
Finally, it is advanced that these policy arguments are consistent
with the pertinent legal authority. The Supreme Court of Florida's deci-
sions in this dispute were not based on controlling legal authority, but
were based on policy arguments which are not logical, and legal author-
ity that is subordinate to the U.S. Constitution.' 7 The U.S. Supreme
id.
13. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Tite Econmics of Moral Hazard: Further Cotment, 58 AM.
ECON. REV. 537, 538 (1968) [hereinafter Arrow, Moral Hazard] ("The underlying point is that ...
the resulting resource allocation will certainly not be socially optimal.").
14. There is a vast literature spanning many disciplines (including ethics, philosophy,
economics, sociology, psychology, and political science) on the fundamental incompatibility
between voter sovereignty and rational collective choice. For an accessible description of this
incompatibility, see ALFRED F. MACKAY, ARROW'S THEOREM: THE PARADOX OF SOCIAL CHOICE:
A CASE STUDY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS 1-12 (1980). This literature is highly cited
within the legal literature. See generally, e.g., Block, supra note 10, at 975-81.
15. It is well-known that rational individual preferences cannot be aggregated to achieve a
rational social preference ordering without imposing socially unacceptable constraints such as
dictatorship. See, e.g., lAIN MCLEAN, PUBLIC CHOICE: AN INTRODUCTION 25 (1987) ("[Tlhere are
deep problems with all procedures of getting from many preferences to one decision."). A
commonly given example of this is the fact that there is nothing inconsistent with a majority
preferring A to B, another majority preferring B to C, and another preferring C to A. See, e.g., id.
at 25-27. This implies that there is no such thing as a "best policy" for the government because
there is no platform that another platform cannot beat. See d. at 103. Mechanisms like plurality
voting, or institutional devices such as the electoral college, can serve to break this cycle and
reach a decision, albeit an unstable one, because efficiency demands that a decision be made
rather than endure an infinite filibuster.
16. WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE
THEORY oF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE 238 (1988).
17. The Florida Supreme Court relied heavily on the "will of the people" in making its
[Vol. 57:1
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Court on the other hand, based its ruling on a strict application of the
law,' 8 but the additional public policy arguments presented here could
further support and advance the Court's ruling.
I. OPTIONS, MORAL HAZARD, AND THE PARADOX OF VOTING
A. The Mechanics of a Call Option
A call option conveys the right to purchase a security at a fixed
price (which is called the strike price or exercise price) for a finite time
period.' 9 When the underlying security is selling in the market for more
than the strike price, the option has an intrinsic value equal to the differ-
ence between the price of the security and the strike price.20 This is due
to the fact that the option holder could exercise the option to purchase
the security at the strike price and immediately resell it at the current
market price, thereby capturing the difference. Such an option is said to
be "in-the-money."''" If the underlying security is selling in the market
for less than the strike price, then the option has an intrinsic value equal
to zero, since it would obviously not be rational to exercise the option
given that the security could be purchased for less than the exercise
price. This scenario is called "out-of-the-money."22
Options with time remaining before expiration are typically worth
much more than their intrinsic value.2 3 This is because an option puts
the holder in a situation in which losses are truncated, but gains are not.
It makes no difference whether the option expires one dollar out of the
money or one hundred dollars out of the money. The result is the same.
But it does make a difference whether the option expires one dollar in
the money or one hundred dollars in the money. Consider an option that
is at the money (the security market price equals the option's strike
price).24 If the value of the underlying security rises, there is a corre-
decision. See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1254 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam) ("[T]his Court,
consistent with legislative policy, has pointed to the 'will of the voters' as the primary guiding
principle to be utilized by trial courts in resolving election contests."). The "will of the voters"
principle is derived from the Florida Constitution's vague and innocuous pronouncement that
"[a]ll political power is inherent in the people." Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris,
772 So. 2d 1220, 1230 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam). But the laws of Florida are subordinate to the
U.S. Constitution under the Supremacy Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
18. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000) (per curiam) ("Seven Justices of the Court
agree that there are constitutional problems with the recount ordered by the Florida Supreme
Court that demand a remedy.").
19. JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONs, FUTURES, & OTHER DERIVATIVES 6 (4th ed. 2000).
20. Id. at 154.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Zvi BODIE ET AL., ESSENTIALS OF INVESTMENTS 541-42 (4th ed. 2001) (discussing the
time value of an option).
24. HULL, supra note 19, at 154.
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sponding one-for-one increase in the option's intrinsic value.25 How-
ever, if the value of the underlying security declines, there is no drop in
the option's intrinsic value.26 As a first and fairly accurate approxima-
tion, the probability of the security decreasing by certain amounts is off-
set by the potential gains in the security.27 Otherwise, the expected price
of the security would not equal the current price and some reason would
need to exist for securities to trade at prices other than their expected
value.
The truncation of losses without truncation of gains is what gives
additional value to options. 28 An analogy to holding a call option at-the-
money is the right to enter a casino or poker game in which winnings
were permitted to be kept while losses were refunded in full. This right
would be valuable and individuals would be willing to pay admission to
enter the casino or game. Modifying the example to an in or out-of-the-
money option merely modifies the analogy to a situation in which losses
are only refunded beyond some deductible or gains are only kept beyond
some threshold. Either way, the option with time remaining before expi-
ration still has significant value due to the truncation of losses.
This situation is somewhat analogous to an election because it
makes no difference whether one loses by one vote or ten million votes.
A loss is a loss. For an individual trailing after an initial election count,
increasing the uncertainty regarding the rules of the election and the
counting of votes can only help the candidate. Votes gained can poten-
tially be sufficient to bring victory while votes lost make no difference
in the status quo.29
A fundamental insight, which the option literature brings to this
scenario, is that when losses are truncated, risk creates value.3° The
greater the risk, the more valuable the option.3 This is because greater
risk implies higher probabilities for large changes in the status quo, but
25. See id. (showing that since a rise in the stock price will put an at-the-money option in the
money and the intrinsic value of an in-the-money option equals the stock price minus the fixed
strike price, a one dollar increase in stock price will create a one dollar increase in intrinsic value
for the at-the-money or in-the-money option).
26. See id. (giving equation for intrinsic value that shows that the intrinsic value is always
zero for an out-of-the money option).
27. See id. at 219-26 (describing the mathematical process for stock price changes used to
value options for which positive and negative changes of given size are equally likely).
28. See BODIE ET AL., supra note 23, at 542.
29. There is a difference in that the election involves a discontinuity-the gains only help if
the trailing candidate overcomes a threshold, and beyond that threshold further gains do not help.
But the fundamental asymmetry between the lack of harm from further losses in votes and the
potential benefit from gains in votes is analogous to an option.
30. See BODIE ET AL., supra note 23, at 543 (stating that increased volatility increases option
value due to limited losses).
31. Id. at 542.
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losses from the status quo are truncated.32 Therefore, the potential gains
are not offset by potential losses and the increased risk creates value.33
This is not typically a problem with plain vanilla listed options on public
equities because the individuals buying the options have no control over
the riskiness of the underlying equity. Their risk is exogenous.
This is not the case in all option-like scenarios, however. It is well-
known that where the holder of an option exercises influence over the
riskiness of the underlying asset, a moral hazard problem exists. 3n The
moral hazard problem leads to socially undesirable conduct in the sense
that resources are not allocated to their best use.35 The view expressed
in this article is that the tactics utilized to contest the initial election
results were a predictable consequence of a moral hazard problem and
that this further led to a tremendous misallocation of legal resources,36
increased political risk,37 a negative impact on financial markets and the
economy, 38 and some loss in the credibility of the political system. 39 It
is further argued that as a matter of policy, arguments that an election
resulted in an incorrect winner should not be considered absent a show-
ing of manipulation of election results-without election tampering, the
loser should not receive a free option with an inescapable moral hazard.
Critics of this view can be expected to argue that the choice of a
national president is far too important a decision to worry about slowing
down the docket in some courts and losing some resources here and
there.4" Installing either the best president or the correct one will lead to
a better designation (or better alignment) of national priorities and long-
run resources which will more than offset any short-term losses. This is
an ends-justify-the-means argument, whereas I argue that the efficiency
32. See id. at 543 ("[E]xtremely good stock outcomes can improve the option payoff without
limit, but extremely poor outcomes cannot worsen the payoff below zero.").
33. See id. ("This asymmetry means volatility in the underlying stock price increases the
expected payoff to the option, thereby enhancing its value.").
34. See JORION, supra note 12, at 286-87 (giving an example of suboptimal behavior resulting
from a moral hazard in an option where the option holder controls risk).
35. See STEPHEN A. Ross ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE 597-98 (4th ed. 1996) (explaining that
managers, working for stockholders who have an option to default, have incentives to invest in
projects in which they should not invest, and not invest in projects in which they should invest).
36. See A Question of Trust: As Confidence in Balloting Weakens, Bush, Gore Make Matters
Worse, USA TODAY, Nov. 13, 2000, at 29A (describing Gore's "utterly self-interested bid to have
the vote count turn out his way at any legal cost").
37. See id. (describing politicians' concerns over "serious danger in a protracted fight").
38. See Peter G. Gosselin, Political Mess Raises Fears of Recession Economy, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 15, 2000, at Cl, available at 2000 WL 25918071 (reporting on economists' concern about
negative impact of recounts on the economy and financial markets).
39. See A Question of Trust, supra note 36 (describing candidates' loss of credibility and
crisis scenarios).
40. See Laurence H. Tribe, Let the Courts Decide, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2000, § 4, at 15
(restating the argument that it is more important to count right than to finish counting).
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of the means, or process, is the more important element at stake. This
view is supported by Professor Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, 4' and
public choice theory.4 2  Advocates of the alternative view-that the
Florida courts appropriately devoted resources and increased uncertainty
regarding the process-must overcome at least two other problems:
there is no evidence that society preferred one candidate over the
other,43 and even if there was, social preferences revealed from elections
are known to be irrational.44
It is not clear that any court could have done anything that would
have resulted in a better president. The fact is, when one considers the
normal error rates in ballot counting, the election was a statistical tie,
both in the national popular vote and in Florida.45 Thus, using the plu-
rality rules model of selecting one candidate as best (a model which
lacks theoretical support but is assumed correct for this argument), there
is no demonstrable evidence that one candidate is better than the other.
That is, all systems of counting are subject to error since we cannot
observe the intent of the voter at the precise moment the choice is
made-at best we can only observe a ballot which is a proxy for voter
intent. This election was so close that, statistically, we cannot reject the
hypothesis that the difference in votes for the top two candidates was
41. Professor Arrow's work suggests that the means cannot be justified by the goal of
reaching society's preferred decision because such a concept cannot exist. Professor Arrow gives
the following interpretation of his theorem:
If we exclude the possibility of interpersonal comparisons of utility [weighing some
votes more than others], then the only methods of passing from individual tastes to
social preferences which will be satisfactory and which will be defined for a wide
range of sets of individual orderings are either imposed or dictatorial.
KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 59 (2d ed. 1963) [hereinafter
ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE]. If rational collective social preferences do not exist, then we should at
least use a decisive process. Negotiating over the rules after the contest is certainly not decisive.
42. Cf DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II, at 53 (1989) (explaining that the cost of time
lost through decision making is an important consideration in public choice).
43. Aside from the fact that the margin of victory was lower than the potential error rate
("potential" describes the error rate because we do not know whether voters whose ballot did not
register a vote chose to choose no candidate), consider that only approximately 100 million votes
were cast in a nation with a population exceeding 281 million.
44. Given the votes for minor candidates, it is fair to say that a majority of voters voted
against both Mr. Bush and Mr. Gore. Thus, we would have a president who a majority of voters
voted against regardless of which candidate won the legal battle.
45. The initial count gave Mr. Bush a lead in Florida of 1,784 out of 5,816,482 votes that
were cast for the two top candidates. See Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S.
70, 73 (2000) (per curiam). This margin is 0.03%. When considering votes for minor candidates,
the margin is smaller. Nationally, Mr. Gore lead Mr. Bush by 232,895 out of 97,451,927 votes
that were cast for the two of them. See Dan Balz, Bush's Florida Lead Shrinks to 300, WASH.
POST, Nov. 15, 2000, at Al, available at 2000 WL 25428401. This margin is 0.2%. Again,
considering votes for minor candidates, the margin is smaller. Nationally, two percent of all
ballots do not register a vote for president. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 103 (2000) (per
curiam).
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zero. Additionally, advocates of a prolonged process must overcome the
well-known fact that our voting system does not necessarily select either
the most desirable or the least objectionable candidate.46 From a public
choice perspective, our society has decided that it is less inefficient to
have a system for selecting elected officials that is clear, final, and
socially acceptable, than to have a system which expends more
resources debating who should select the best officials and by which
method. This is an argument against giving a losing candidate the
option to litigate over the rules and standards for interpreting ballots
after the election.
B. Moral Hazard
Moral hazard can be described as a situation in which an individual
has been insulated from the economic consequences of his actions.47
The classic example is the case of an insured individual.4" A person
with full coverage for all automobile losses lacks the economic incentive
to drive as carefully as he otherwise would were there no insurance.49
Likewise, an individual with full medical coverage lacks the economic
incentive to control costs, find the best prices, avoid frivolous treat-
ments, and exercise a degree of prudence which would be exercised in
the absence of insurance." In the insurance context, the moral hazard
problem exists wherever the event against which insurance is taken out
is at least partially within the control of the individual.5 The wide-
spread use of copayments and deductibles is an effort to mitigate the
moral hazard problem.52
Professor Arrow, a Nobel laureate, is among those who have noted
the economic importance of the moral hazard problem:
There is one particular case of the effect of differential information
on the workings of the market economy (or indeed any complex
economy) which is so important as to deserve special comment: one
agent can observe the joint effects of the unknown state of the world
46. See McLEAN, supra note 15, at 156 (explaining why plurality voting fails all desirable
criteria for voting systems abysmally).
47. See KENNETH J. ARROW, The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the
Choice of Market Versus Nonntarket Allocation, reprinted in 2 COLLECTED PAPERS OF KENNETH J.




51. KENNETH J. ARROW, General Economnic Equilibrium: Purpose, Analytic Techniques,
Collective Choice, reprinted in 2 COLLECTED PAPERS OF KENNETH J. ARROW 222 (1983)
[hereinafter ARROW, Econonic Equilibrium].
52. Cf Arrow, Moral Hazard, supra note 13, at 538 (describing healthcare rationing as a
reasonable method for improving the allocation of resources in the presence of moral hazard).
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and of decisions by another economic agent, but not the state or the
decision separately. This case is known in the insurance literature as
"moral hazard," but ... insurance examples are only a small fraction
of all the illustrations of this case and ... the case will be referred to
here as the "confounding of risks and decisions." An insurance com-
pany may easily observe that a fire has occurred but cannot, without
special investigation, know whether the fire was due to causes exoge-
nous to the insured or to decisions of his (arson, or at least careless-
ness). In general, any system which, in effect, insures against
adverse final outcomes automatically reduces the incentives to good
decision making.
51
Professor Arrow further observed how the moral hazard problem is
applicable to a wide range of areas and diverse fields including medical
care. 54 He further stated:
In fact, it is not a mere empirical accident that not all the contingent
markets needed for efficiency exist, but a necessary fact with deep
implications for the workings and structure of economic institu-
tions. . . . The very existence of insurance will change individual
behavior in the direction of less care in avoiding risks. The insurance
policy that would be called for by an optimal allocation of risk bear-
ing would only cover unavoidable risks and would distinguish their
effects from those due to behavior of the individual. But in fact all
the insurer can observe is a result, for example, a fire or the success
or failure of a business, and he cannot decompose it into exogenous
and endogenous components. Contingent contracts, to speak gener-
ally, can be written only on mutually observed events, not on aspects
of the state of the world which may be known to one but not both of
the parties.
55
In Mr. Gore's case, once the polls had closed and the initial count
showed him to have been defeated, Mr. Gore was effectively insured
against adverse outcomes resulting from legal and political challenges to
the election. This impediment to good decision making described by
Professor Arrow refers to good decision making from the point of allo-
cating scarce resources to their most socially valuable use, not to any
impediment to good decision making from the point of maximizing Mr.
Gore's own personal welfare. Mr. Gore's option position was immedi-
ately apparent to anyone with a basic understanding of business. As one
Iowa farmer observed, "[H]e's got nothing to lose.... I'd think he was
a fool if he didn't challenge the thing."56 But this is precisely the
53. ARROW, Economic Activity, supra note 47, at 143.
54. Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Econonics of Medical Care, 53 AM.
ECON. REv. 941, 960-62 (1963).
55. ARROW, Economic Equilibrium, supra note 51, at 222.
56. Jon Sawyer & Bill Lambrecht, Opinions Run the Gannt Among Citizens Waiting for
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point-because of the situation, Mr. Gore's claim that election laws
were misinterpreted and misapplied had absolutely no credibility and
never should have been considered in the first place absent evidence of
manipulation.
In the financial setting, an option can be viewed as a form of insur-
ance. 57 Options truncate potential losses, which is essentially the defini-
tion of insurance. An alternative way of understanding the comparison
is to consider a call option as protection against future price increases.
Where the individual has some control of the event affecting the exer-
cise of the option (or the payout of insurance), however, the moral haz-
ard problem in the financial option context is much more severe than in
the traditional insurance context. In the traditional insurance context the
individual has only lost the economic incentive to avoid excessive risk.58
At worst, the individual becomes ambivalent towards risk, but more
likely the individual continues to have some nonpecuniary incentives to
live healthy and drive safely. This is because one cannot profit from
traditional insurance-one can only avoid losses. In the financial set-
ting, the individual with the option actually benefits from increasing risk
without bearing any of the social costs this risk may create. 9
This is essentially the situation that the trailing candidate in a close,
contested election result finds himself. The incentive is to create the
greatest amount of legal and political uncertainty about the validity of
the outcome because he has nothing to lose (truncated losses) and every-
thing to gain. This suggests that we can learn something about optimal
policy regarding election contests from the economic literature on moral
hazard and the financial literature on options. I suggest that the lesson is
that the option should not exist, and courts should not consider such
cases absent a showing of fraud. I further argue that this conclusion is
implied by our legal system in which the impossible goal of selecting
the "best" candidate is sacrificed (so far as one can sacrifice that which
is unattainable) in furtherance of the goal of having political contests
settled with quickness and finality according to rules fixed in advance of
the vote.
If Mr. Gore had stated in his campaign that he would seek judicial
Election's Conclusion, ST. Louis Posr-DSPATCii, Dec. 3, 2000, at Al, available at 2000 WL
3563952.
57. JORION, supra note 12, at 43 (describing bank deposit insurance as a type of option).
58. Cf Arrow, Moral Hazard, supra note 13, at 538 ("Because of the moral hazard, complete
reliance on economic incentives does not lead to an optimal allocation of' resources in general. In
most societies alternative relationships are built up which to some extent serve to permit
cooperation and risk sharing.").
59. See JORION, supra note 12, at 287 (describing how individuals with options benefit from
increasing risk).
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intervention and hand examination of selected ballots, in the event of a
close vote, he would have born much of the risk of his subsequent
action. But by being given the opportunity to wait until the ballots had
been marked and counted in Mr. Bush's favor, Mr. Gore was able to
create uncertainty about the legal and political interpretation of the elec-
tion laws and the methods used to count the ballots without taking risk
himself while benefitting from increased risk placed on society. If the
Florida legal system had reacted as some legal experts initially predicted
the law required, Mr. Gore would have been called out before reaching
first base.6" This would have sent a strong message that society will not
suffer the costs of giving free options with a moral hazard to the candi-
date losing a fair, albeit imperfect, election.
C. Options with Endogenous Risk
A commonly utilized example of an option with endogenous risk is
the case of a corporation financed in part with debt that is owned by
someone other than the stockholders. 6 This scenario is the equivalent
of the equity owners of the firm having sold the firm to the debt holders
while simultaneously buying a call option on the firm from the bond-
holders.12 The limited liability nature of equity allows the equity hold-
ers to wait until the debt is maturing (which is when their option
expires), and then make a decision to exercise their option.63 If the
value of the firm's assets is less than the face value of the debt (which is
the exercise price), then the stockholders walk and allow their option to
expire.64 On the other hand, if the value of the firm exceeds the face
value of the debt, the equity holders will exercise their call and buy back
the business.65
This insight further leads to the conclusion that, under certain cir-
cumstances, the equity holders-through their control on manage-
ment-have powerful incentives to make decisions that are detrimental
to the corporation and simply bad capital investment decisions when
analyzed in isolation.66 This incentive is strongest when the value of the
firm is low relative to the face value of the debt-i.e.,, when the equity
owners' option is out-of-the-money (or when the election count results
60. See Tim Novak & Abdon M. Pallasch, Overturn of Election is Unlikelv: Evidence of
Fraud Needed, Cm,. SUN-TMES, Nov. 10, 2000, at 6 (reporting on interviews with election
experts).
61. See Ross 1- AL., Supt' note 35, at 592-93.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 593.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See id. at 421-23 (giving examples).
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in a loss).67 The explanation for this result is that the truncation of
losses puts those with the option in a position to benefit from excessive
risk and to suffer from prudent and optimal levels of risk taking.68 The
reason is that the out-of-the-money option holders who control the level
of risk are able to engage in a scenario in which they are essentially able
to gamble with another's money and keep any winnings while disavow-
ing liability for losses-the old "heads I win, tails you lose" game.6 9
Additionally, they may pass up highly profitable, low-risk invest-
ments-especially where an infusion of capital is needed-because they
will not reap the benefits of the gains.7"
This can be illustrated with a highly simplified example. Suppose
we have a corporation whose only asset is $1 million in cash. Further,
suppose that the firm has a $2 million debt obligation maturing
tomorrow. From the stockholder's viewpoint, the best decision the cor-
poration could possibly make would be to buy $1 million worth of tick-
ets for tonight's drawing in the Powerball lottery. Only an incredibly
speculative investment could generate enough of a payoff to benefit the
shareholders, and due to limited liability they can impose such risks on
others without bearing it themselves. (Much like Al Gore could impose
the risk created by disputing the interpretation of ambiguous statutes and
case law without bearing the brunt of the risk himself."1 )
Of course, one could argue that my example is not realistic and that
the bondholders would have a cause of action in this hypothetical. That
is not the point. Fiduciary duties to creditors are extremely weak at
best,7" and in this scenario the legal system operates as little more than a
last chance to salvage an already wrecked train.73 Even if bondholders
could make a claim, it would be after the fact and entail significant legal
67. See id. at 421 ("Firms near bankruptcy oftentimes take great chances, because they feel
that they are playing with someone else's money.").
68. See id. at 421-23 (giving examples).
69. A story, perhaps apocryphal, illustrates this idea. It seems that Federal Express
was near financial collapse within a few years of its inception. The founder,
Frederick Smith, took $20,000 of corporate funds to Las Vegas in despair. He won
at the gaming tables, providing enough capital to allow the firm to survive. Had he
lost, the banks would simply have received $20.000 less when the firm reached
bankruptcy.
Id. at 421-22.
70. id. at 422.
71. Indeed, some analysts have suggested that Mr. Gore enhanced his political future with the
challenge. See Harris & Connolly, supra note II.
72. Cf Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Puzzling Paradox of Preterred Stock (and Why We Should
Care About It), 51 Bus. LAW. 443, 449 (1996) (noting that creditors can bring derivative
litigation, but it will generally be of' little benefit to them).
73. Cf Victor Brudney. Corporate Bondholders and Debtor Oppornmism: In Bad Times and
Good, 105 HARV. L. RFV. 1821, 1828-29 (1992) (noting further reduction in the value of credilor
claims in insolvency brought about by the Bankruptcy Act of 1978).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
costs and hurdles. Furthermore, they could only obtain judgment against
the directors, not all stockholders. Bankruptcy would provide a further
shield reinforcing limited liability. The purpose of a simplified example
is merely to show a change in incentives, and thus a change in behavior.
The ultimate point is that the holder of an out-of-the-money option bene-
fits from increased risk, and to the extent that she exerts influence over
the level of risk, a moral hazard problem exists. Clearly, such extreme
speculative investments create a misallocation of capital."4
As mentioned earlier, not only do the equity holders have incen-
tives to take poor investments, but they might also have an incentive to
bypass good investments.7 - Suppose our firm above was presented with
the opportunity to invest $1.25 million overnight without any risk and
receive a gross $1.5 million the next day. Clearly a no-risk return of 20
percent per day is good. But the equity holders will not benefit from the
investment, and will even lose since they would have to infuse addi-
tional equity which would subsequently be taken by the creditors.76
D. The Paradox of Voting
It has long been known that voting is not an effective method of
reaching optimal social goals. 77 The paradox of voting-the fact that
election results need not map into social preferences and social prefer-
ences need not be transitive-was formally proven by Professor Arrow
about fifty years ago.78 While variations and refinements on the proof
have been presented, the conclusions have withstood rigorous scrutiny
over the test of time.79 Indeed, the importance of Professor Arrow's
proof is in large part responsible for his Nobel Prize in economics in
1972.2
While Professor Arrow was given credit for development of the
formal proof that no solution exists to the paradox of voting, he traces
knowledge of the paradox back to a 1770 paper by Jean-Charles de
Borda. Professor Arrow also relies on several papers by the Marquis de
Condorcet and others written in the eighteenth century that indicate that
74. See JORION, supra note 12, at 43 (giving the great savings and loan debacle that cost
taxpayers $150 billion as an cxalmplc of such capital misallocation).
75. See Ross rT AL., supra note 35, at 422 (giving an example).
76. Id.
77. The inception of miathemalical analysis applied to voting rules is attributed to Jean-
Charles de Borda (1781) and the Marquis de Condorcet (1785). Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice
in Perspective, in PERSLcIVES ON PuBLIC CmoIcE I (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997).
78. ARROW, SOCIAL CH-OICE, s.opra note 41, at 46-59. The first edition was published in
1951. See id. at Preface.
79. See Block, supra note 10, at 982 (stating that no one has argued that the paradox is false).
80. See Kathy Sawyer, A Paradox qf Majority PolitiCS, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 1995, at A3,
available at 2000 WL 9266242.
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the paradox of voting was well known.8 Interestingly, the paradox was
independently discovered again about one hundred years later when
Lewis Carroll, while on the faculty at an Oxford college, observed that
the outcomes of faculty meetings were inconsistent and sensitive to pro-
cedural rules.82 Professor Arrow's modern contribution is formally
proving under very general conditions that it is impossible to create any
democratic voting scheme that will result in rational social prefer-
ences. 3 In other words, democracy and a coherent ordering of social
choices are logically incompatible. 4 One of the great ironies of the
2000 presidential election challenge is that Professor Tribe argued
before the U.S. Supreme Court in support of the Florida Supreme
Court's reliance on the will of the people as the paramount interest. He
had previously noted in his popular textbook on constitutional law that
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem suggests that there is no such thing as
the will of the peopleY.5 It seems likely that if the Justices had been
aware of this, they might have questioned him as to how he could argue
in support of an opinion based on something he knew to be impossible
to exist.
The paradox of voting is shown with a simple example. Suppose
there are three voters and three alternatives: X, Y, and Z. Suppose that
the first voter prefers alternative X to Y and Y to Z; the second voter
prefers Y to Z and Z to X; and the third prefers Z to X and X to Y. Then a
majority of voters prefer X to Y and Y to Z. Thus, transitivity of majority
preferences would imply that X is preferred to Z-but this is not true.
This example is obviously a simplified special case of voting.
Arrow formally showed with an axiomatic approach that when reasona-
ble conditions for the process of social choice are laid down (essentially
that preferences not be dictated or imposed and that choices be respon-
sive to the desires of the individuals), then this set of conditions is inter-
nally inconsistent.86 "That is, there is no democratic constitution, no
matter how complicated, which can always be sure of producing a
method of social choice that satisfies certain ordinary properties of
81. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE, supra note 41, at 93-94.
82. MCLEAN, supra note 15, at 10.
83. MACKAY, supra note 14, at 1-5.
84. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE, supra note 41, at 59 (showing that his Theorem 2 proves it is
impossible to construct any method of voting which will result in rational social choices without
restricting individual preferences).
85. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSr]TUTIONAL LAW § 1-8, at 12 n.6 (2d ed. 1988)
(noting that Arrow's theorem suggests that there is no hope of meaningfully constructing majority
will).
86. MACKAY, supra note 14, at 3 ("Arrow shows that no device can jointly satisfy four
apparently reasonable requirements ....").
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coherence. ' 7
While the mathematical proof of the paradox of voting may be dif-
ficult for nonmathematicians, the intuition should not be surprising. It
could easily be conceived that a majority of people prefer Bush to
McCain, McCain to Gore, and Gore to Bush. Throw Bradley into the
equation and the possibilities for intransitivities increase multiplica-
tively. The outcome can then be dependent on how the choices are
paired. Primary elections are a method that can lead to a result inconsis-
tent with majority preferences. A general election with a runoff between
the top two will do the same. Consider the Bush-McCain-Gore exam-
ple. The person winning the election would be the person dominated by
the first one eliminated."
Majority voting can lead to situations far more repugnant than a
misallocation of government expenditures. Voting systems have been
used to legitimize and reaffirm the institution of slavery. Many authors
have written at length on tyranny of the majority.8" Majority religions
have imposed their will on minority religions. One well documented
example of a worldwide majority that imposes their own interests on a
sizeable worldwide minority without much compromise or serious
thought is the right-handed majority.9"
Public choice theory suggests that institutions develop for rea-
sons.9 The motivation behind the plurality rules method of voting is
not promotion of society's preferred choices. This follows from the fact
that no voting system produces a consistent set of choices. Indeed, the
most reasonable argument which has ever been made in defense of our
voting system is that it is no worse than any alternatives.92 Given that
our system of voting (or any system of voting) does not exist to promote
87. ARROW, SOCIAL CioicE, supra note 41, at book cover.
88. We can arbitrarily pick one person to lose in the first round, say McCain. Then Gore
would defeat Bush, but McCain was preferred to Gore. If we start by eliminating either of' the
other two, we get the same anomaly. Obviously, institutions such as the two party system and
primary elections are important in determining the outcome. Arrow's theorem, however, proves
that there is no system that will consistently result in selecting the people's choice, essentially
because the people's choice does not exist-it is an internally inconsistent concept.
89. See, e.g., RiKER, supra note 16, at 247-48.
90. See Sharon Wong, 77Teir Right to be Left, NLw S'rArs TiMEs (MALAYSIA), Aug. 6, 2000,
at 10, available at 2000 WL 22843731; Deborah Bach, Left Out? Today's Your Day to Celebrate:
Left-Handers Look far a Little Recognition in a Right-Handed World, BALr. SUN, Aug. 13, 2000,
at 6F, available at 2000 WL 4876026; Peter Silverton, On the Other Hand: Colour-Blitdtess
Dyslexia, High Morality, and Unsavory Reputations, OttSERVtit, Aug. 13, 2000, at 39, available
at 2000 WL 21300949; Andrew Cunningham, Schools Deny Left-Handers Their Rights, SUNDAY
TirMs (LONDON), Nov. 12, 2000, at Features Section, available at 2000 WL 29756975.
91. See JAMES M. BUCiANAN & GOROON TUtLOCK, Tin, CALCULUS OF CONSENT 287 (1962)
(arguing that institutions develop to benefit groups of individuals).
92. See Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislatit. 74 VA. L. REv. 339, 368 (1988)
("[Dlemocracy is still better than the alternatives.").
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the best social choices, we must look elsewhere for its motivating fac-
tors. We vote because it is an acceptable method for making a decision
about who will govern, and then we move on. We recognize that there
is no socially acceptable method of making the best decisions. There-
fore, rather than seeking efficiency in the decisions, we, as a society,
seek efficiency in the process. There is value in quickly settling dis-
putes, making decisions, and moving on. Casting ballots and then objec-
tively counting those ballots is efficient. Litigating over appropriate
subjective standards to employ in counting ballots after the initial counts
is not efficient. The uncountable opinions given throughout the contest
expressing the need to resolve the contest and move forward with an
effective government regardless of the outcome demonstrates that many
in society view elections in this manner. 3 It would seem more efficient
and decisive to have machines correctly tabulate ballots marked in
accordance with instructions than to have thousands of individuals with
no specific guidance divine the intent of voters who mark their ballots
contrary to instructions.
II. LEGAL BACKDROP TO THE ELECTION CHALLENGE
A. Federal Law
A summary of the relevant federal law prior to analyzing the Flor-
ida law is useful. Three written provisions of federal law received the
most attention in the contest. These will be summarized in the following
order: Article II of the U.S. Constitution, which vests the power to select
electors with the States;94 3 U.S.C. § 5, providing for Congressional
recognition of electors under certain conditions;95 and the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.96
In Article II, Clause 2 of Section 1 begins, "Each State shall
appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number
of Electors . . . . " A simple reading of this language suggests the
following points. First, the right to select electors belongs to the states,
not the people-i.e., there is no right of suffrage in the U.S. Constitu-
tion.98 There are only limits on the states' ability to grant suffrage selec-
93. See. e.g.. Seeking Redress Through the Courts Bush-Gore, BALT. SUN, Nov. 25, 2000, at
16A, available at 2000 WL 4885059 (noting that some people were impatient and desiring a quick
resolution).
94. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
95. 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2000).
96. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
97. U.S. CONST. art. II, § I, cl. 2.
98. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (per curiam) ("The individual citizen has no
federal constitutional right to vote for electors for the President of the United States ....").
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tively.99 Second, the power to choose the method for selecting electors
is vested exclusively in the state legislatures.' This is not a matter
which can be abridged by state constitutions.'' A state constitution
vesting power in the electorate would be unconstitutional under the U.S.
Constitution's Supremacy Clause in Article VI, Clause 2.112 However, a
state legislature, having the power to appoint electors, could pass a law
specifying how the electors would be selected, therefore placing its
determination in the electorate.0 3 Arguably, the legislature could do
this through a simple resolution, which would not require a Governor's
approval nor a veto override, and would also make the legislature the
arbiter of interpretation rather than the judiciary. Where the legislature
has provided for the selection of electors by statute, though, reason sug-
gests that the judiciary has authority to interpret that statute, particularly
where the legislature has assigned the judiciary a role in resolving elec-
tion contests. 104
Nevertheless, the power to determine the method of appointing
electors is vested solely in the legislatures.0 5 Thus, while they can dele-
gate the power, they cannot sever their authority under the U.S. Consti-
tution.0 6 This means that they can change their minds and override any
delegation of their authority just as the president can delegate decisions
to the cabinet and override their decisions."' 7 The selection of electors
by the legislature is not reviewable by the state judiciary." 8
There is another subtle but important point which has not been ade-
quately emphasized. The power to select electors resides solely in the
legislatures. Thus, although state courts may interpret statutory provi-
sions delegating this legislative power to the people, the state judici-
ary-in the context of a presidential election-cannot modify or expand
this legislative delegation."' 9 The practical significance of this is that
99. Id. at 104-05 ("Having once granted the right to vote on equal terms, the State may not,
by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person's vote over that of another.").
100. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27 (1892) ("The Constitution ...leaves it to the
legislature exclusively to define the method of effecting the object.").
101. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 78 (2000) (per curiarn)
(vacating the Supreme Court of Florida's decision in Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v.
Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam), in part because it might be construed as relying
on the Florida Constitution as circumscribing legislative authority under Article I1).
102. U.S. CONsTr. art. VI, cl. 2.
103. Blacker, 146 U.S. at 27.
104. See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam) (observing that the
legislature intended lor election contests to be resolved in a judicial forum).
105. Blacker, 146 U.S. at 27.
106. Id. at 35.
107. Id. (calling legislative power to appoint electors "plenary").
108. Id.
109. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 113 (2000) (Rehnquist, CJ., Scalia & Thomas, JJ.,
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judicially created case law and dicta pertaining to the same code in the
context of state elections is not applicable in the context of a presidential
election.' 'o In other words, it is perfectly reasonable and proper for the
state court to consider constraints imposed by the state constitution in
interpreting a statute in the context of a local election, but the state con-
stitution cannot be construed in a manner inconsistent with the U.S.
Constitution.''' Furthermore, the prior Florida case law interpreting the
election statutes in the context of local elections could be persuasive, but
cannot be binding authority in the context of a presidential election.''
2
For example, the Florida Constitution could provide that in all elections
where no individual received a majority, a runoff between the top two
candidates would be held within four weeks. Clearly this could not
apply to a presidential election without the consent of the legislature.' 3
And, if the legislature were to pass an act stating that presidential elec-
tors would be awarded to the plurality winner, then the Florida Supreme
Court would not be free to rule such an act invalid under Florida law.
Thus, the Florida Supreme Court's assertion that under the Florida
Constitution the will of the people is the paramount interest,'" is an
argument which-in the context of a presidential election-is overrid-
den by both the plain language of the U.S. Constitution and its estab-
lished interpretation. In McPherson v. Blacker, the Supreme Court
reviewed the history of Article II and found precisely this interpreta-
tion.' '5 If the Florida Supreme Court could have made an argument that
it was merely interpreting the legislature's delegation of power, then it
might have had some hope of surviving this constitutional obstacle to
effecting its result.'t6 In Gore I, The Florida Supreme Court required
the Secretary of State to accept amended returns until the Court fash-
ioned a new deadline from its power to invoke an equitable remedy.
concurring) ("[Tihe text of the election law itself, and not just its interpretation by the courts of
the States, takes on independent significance.").
110. Id. at 115 ("To attach definitive weight to the pronouncement of a state court, when the
very question at issue is whether the court has actually departed from the statutory meaning,
would be to abdicate our responsibility to enforce the explicit requirements of Article iI.").
I11. Id.
112. Id.
113. Blacker, 146 U.S. at 34-35.
114. See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1227 (Fla. 2000) (per
curiam) ("Twenty-five years ago, this Court commented that the will of the people, not a hyper-
technical reliance upon statutory provisions, should be our guiding principle in election cases
115. Blacker, 146 U.S. at 25-35.
116. Justice Ginsburg argued vehemently that the Florida court was merely interpreting the
legislative scheme as the legislature intended it should. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 136 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting). If the Supreme Court of Florida had provided different reasoning in its opinion, it
is possible that more Justices would have accepted her argument.
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There is little question that the Florida Supreme Court based that deci-
sion on its interpretation of Florida's constitution,' 17 and it clearly inter-
preted Florida's constitution in such a way as to be unconstitutional
under the U.S. Constitution.' "' Specifically, the Court appears to have
interpreted Article I, Section I of the Florida Constitution stating, "All
political power is inherent in the people" to mean that the will of the
people is more important than the technical delegation of elector selec-
tion given by the legislature via statute.'" The Florida court further
went on to state that the legislature could not impose unreasonable or
unnecessary restraints on the right to vote (such as following voting
instructions in marking a ballot).
2
1)
Thus, it appears that the Florida Supreme Court based its decision
on the premise that under the state constitution the power to choose elec-
tors resides in the people, and that the legislature may not unnecessarily
restrict that right. This is unconstitutional, and in hindsight it appears as
if the U.S. Supreme Court really demonstrated exceptional polity in its
first remand to Florida's high court, giving them an opportunity to base
their results on a different theory or find a less embarrassing way out. 12,
For some inexplicable reason, the Florida Supreme Court chose to
ignore this second chance and should bear the blame for the resulting
consequences. By hammering over and over that its decision was based
on "the will of the electorate"-a judicial invention-rather than relying
solely on findings of legislative intent, the court missed any opportunity
it might have had to obtain its desired result.
There is yet another point which should be made in this subsection
pertaining to the interaction of the U.S. Supreme Court and the Florida
Supreme Court and criticism of the former. It has been argued that the
U.S. Supreme Court should not have accepted the case because the case
dealt solely with Florida law, and the Florida Supreme Court is obvi-
ously the final arbiter of Florida law.' 2 2 This is an incredibly weak legal
argument for two reasons. First, the Florida Supreme Court is obviously
not the final arbiter of the U.S. Constitution. 23 Since the Florida Court
was obligated to interpret the state law in a manner consistent with the
117. See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1235-37.
118. See id. at 1236 (stating that the Florida Constitution prohibits unnecessary restraints on
voting and technical statutory requirement cannot take priority over citizens' right to vote, thereby
abridging legislative prerogative to choose the manner of appointing electors).
119. See id.
120. Id.
121. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 78 (2000) (per curiam).
122. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 123 (2000) (per curiam) (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, &
Breyer, JJ., dissenting) ("The federal questions that ultimately emerged in this case are not
substantial.").
123. Id. at 103 (stating the Constitutional questions presented by the case).
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U.S. Constitution, it obviously was obligated to interpret the U.S. Con-
stitution (if it were doing its job) in order to perform the former function.
Thus, if the Florida court had discussed its interpretation of the U.S.
Constitutional limitations, then the U.S. Supreme Court would clearly
have the opportunity to determine whether the Florida court had done so
correctly. The fact that the Florida court did not provide a coherent
discussion of pertinent federal constitutional law cannot create an effec-
tive wall to hide from U.S. Supreme Court scrutiny.24
Second, while selecting Florida's presidential electors is primarily
a Florida matter, the notion that it is exclusively a matter solely internal
to Florida is overly simplistic.' 5 In the context of presidential elections,
state and federal law are intractably intertwined. Federal law has pre-
empted state law on the regulation of certain aspects of absentee bal-
lots.' 26 Elections are regulated by the Federal Election Commission and
limits are set regarding the means and amounts which can be raised and
spent. 27 Clearly, Florida could not pass a law stating that presidential
election campaigns in Florida are exempt from federal regulation.
2
1
Clearly, Florida could not pass a law stating that television and radio
stations in Florida do not have to provide candidates with equal free
time. 21 While the U.S. Supreme Court should not intrude into matters
purely of state law, it is naYve to suggest that this is one of those occa-
sions. The fact that nine Supreme Court Justices unanimously agreed
that the potential for conflict with the U.S. Constitution existed depend-
ing on the Florida Court's theory'"" suggests that the subsequent criti-
cism of the Supreme Court majority alleging partisan interference is
highly unfair.
In McPherson v. Blacker, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
power of the legislature to select electors is absolute under the U.S. Con-
stitution.' 3 ' Blacker involved a challenge to the Michigan legislature's
action in 1891 to change the manner in which the state's presidential
electors were selected to a district election system. 32 McPherson
brought a challenge to the law on the grounds that it was repugnant to
the federal Constitution. 33 The Supreme Court of Michigan upheld the
legislature, and the decision was unanimously affirmed on appeal to the
124. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. at 78.
125. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 112 (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, & Thomas, JJ., concurring).
126. 42 U.S.C. § 19731f (2000).
127. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-442 (2000).
128. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (2000).
129. Id.
130. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 78 (2000) (per curiam).
131. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 34-35 (1892) (quoting S. REP. No. 395).
132. Id. at I-3.
133. Id.
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U.S. Supreme Court.'34 In its opinion, the Michigan court noted that the
plain language of the Constitution is clear, and that the interpretation
that the state legislatures have the exclusive power to select presidential
electors has always been given the interpretation. 135 It further noted that
the manner of selection cannot be limited by state constitutions, nor even
irrevocably constrained by the legislature itself for the power "can
neither be taken away nor abdicated."'
' 36
3 U.S.C. § 5 has been interpreted as a safe harbor for recognition of
a state's presidential electors by Congress.137 The section states that if a
state has provided for the appointment of electors by laws enacted prior
to election day, and if the final determination of this appointment shall
have been made at least six days prior to the meeting of the electoral
college, then such determination shall be conclusive.1 38 This section
came into play during the election challenge in two respects. First, it
was argued in the U.S. Supreme Court's unanimous opinion in Bush I
that action by the Florida Supreme Court could be construed to go
beyond mere interpretation of existing law and be deemed to be creation
of new law placing the State's electors chosen by the challenge process
outside of the safe harbor provision.' 9 Second, the Florida Supreme
Court's holding, that the Florida legislature intended to obtain the full
protection of the safe harbor, proved to be the basis for the U.S.
Supreme Court's halt of all recounts on December 12, 2000.14° Decem-
ber 12th was six days before the meeting of the electoral college and it
was impossible to come up with a manual recount process that fulfilled
minimal equal protection requirements before the end of the day on
December 12th.' 4 '
Finally, equal protection arguments were raised in several areas. 1
42
The arguments were essentially that: recounts conducted only in por-
tions of the state violated equal protection; 4 3 recounts which manually
examined only ballots registering no vote by machine, and not examin-
ing ballots registering one vote or more than one vote, violated equal
134. Id. at 42.
135. Id. at 36 ("The construction to which we have referred has prevailed too long and been
too uniform to justify us in interpreting the language of the Constitution as conveying any other
meaning than that heretofore ascribed, and it must be treated as decisive.").
136. Id. at 35.
137. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 77 (2000) (per curiam).
138. 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2000).
139. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. at 78.
140. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000) (per curiam).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 103-10.
143. Id. at 106-07.
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protection;" and recounts that applied widely varying standards in
accessing voter intent violated equal protection. 145  These arguments
proved to be the ones which ultimately prevailed in the opinion of the
majority of Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court.4 6 One dissent sug-
gested that the majority created new equal protection law because it had
never applied equal protection analysis to the manner in which votes are
counted, only to the allocation of votes.' 47 However, it is difficult to see
why this distinction should be dispositive given that the question of
equal protection in vote tabulation had not been before the Court
previously.
It may be that a majority of the Justices felt that equal protection
was the strongest argument because in the context of a fundamental right
such as voting, 48 the state cannot treat people differently unless it can
survive strict scrutiny and show that the unequal treatment is necessary
to promote a compelling state interest. "41 While the state might have a
compelling interest in the conflicting objectives of speedy and accurate
vote tabulation, it is hard to argue that requiring manual recounts on a
subset of votes without any uniform standards is necessary to promote
those interests.
B. Florida Law
A summary of pertinent Florida law is also useful prior to analysis
of the events taking place during the election contest. As Professor Low-
enstein noted, the Florida election statutes are not the most coherent,'
and the Florida Supreme Court found a number of ambiguous and incon-
sistent sections.15' Any attempt to try to analyze the entire code is prob-
ably counterproductive, and just a few of the key provisions are
summarized. With respect to the timing for counting votes, the Florida
code requires counties to have their results submitted by 5:00 p.m. on
the seventh day following the election, and further provides that any
144. Id. at 108.
145. Id. at 109.
146. Id. at 110 (per cUriarn) ("Seven Justices of the Court agree that there are constitutional
problems with the recount ordered by the Florida Supreme Court that denand a remedy.").
147. Id. at 125 (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, & Breyer JJ., dissenting) ("IW]e have never before
called into question the substantive standard by which a State determines that a vote has been
legally cast.").
148. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966).
149. Gerald Gunther, Forward to The Supreme Court 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. Riv. 1, 21
(1972) (stating that strict scrutiny asks whether the ends are compelling and the means are
necessary).
150. David G. Savage & Henry Weinstein, America Waits: Justices Focus on the 'How' of
Recounts, L.A. TIMrs, Nov. 21, 2000, at AI, available at 2000 WL 25920609.
151. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris. 772 So. 2d 1220, 1231 (Fla. 2000) (per
curiam) ("The provisions of the Code are ambiguous .... ).
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counties that have not met the deadline shall have their returns
ignored.'15 This was the basis for Harris's original announcement that
she would not extend the deadline. 53 However, the time issue is con-
founded by the fact that a candidate may protest the results any time
until certification and a manual recount may be conducted. 54 Allowing
for someone to file a protest at the last moment while still certifying the
results would effectively deny the opportunity to conduct a manual
recount. '
55
The second key issue involved manual recounts authorized as the
result of a protest. ' 56 The Florida code authorizes manual recounts when
there has been "an error in the vote tabulation sufficient to place the
results in question."' 57 The interpretation of this language became one
of the more controversial aspects of the case.' Whether a machine not
reading an improperly marked ballot constituted an error in vote tabula-
tion became a point of disagreement.
5
1
A third key issue became the grounds for contesting certified
results.' 6" Under Florida law, the results may be contested due to the
"rejection of a sufficient number of legal votes."'' The meaning of this
language also became a point of heated dispute at the end of the chal-
lenge because the last series of manual recounts was conducted under
the theory that machines reading an improperly marked ballot as "no
vote" constituted the rejection of a legal vote if manual inspection could
discern voter intent. 162
Florida election law also consists of some judicial opinions. In
Gore I, the Florida Supreme Court wrote, "Twenty-five years ago, this
Court commented that the will of the people, not a hyper-technical reli-
ance upon statutory provisions, should be our guiding principle in elec-
tion cases . ".."'63 That reference was to Boardnan v. Esteva. "'64
Interestingly, prior to Boardman, Florida law generally required strict
compliance with statutory voting requirements, but the Boardman court
152. FLA. SIAT. ch. 102.111 (2000).
153. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1225-26.
154. FLA. SWAT. ch. 102.166 (2000).
155. Paln Bcach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1235.
156. See id. at 1231-32.
157. See FLA. STAT. ch. 102.166 (2000).
158. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 119 (2000) (per curiam) (Rchnquist, C.J., Scalia, &
Thomas, JJ., concurring) (characterizing the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation as absurd).
159. Id.
160. See Gore v. Harris. 772 So. 2d 1243, 1248-52 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam).
161 . FLA. SAT. Ch. 102.168 (2000).
162. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1260-61.
163. Paln Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1227 (Fla. 2000) (per
curiani).
164. 323 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1975).
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expressly rescinded this rule in favor of a substantial compliance rule.1'1
5
However, there are three important distinctions between Boardinan and
the 2000 presidential election that should limit its applicability. First,
Boardman involved a local election, not a presidential nor even state-
wide election. 66 Obviously, there is greater potential for conflict with
the Constitution in an election for president. Second, Boardman only
dealt with the validity of absentee ballots. 167 Third, the Boardinan court
gave deference to both the trial court and election officials, noting "that
returns certified by election officials are presumed to be correct."' 6 8
Aside from dicta about the will of the people being the paramount inter-
est, there is nothing in Florida's case law which would appear to support
an order that election officials conduct a partial manual recount absent
fraud. 1
69
III. THE LEGAL CHALLENGE
A. Overview
The statistical closeness of the election results created an opportu-
nity for Mr. Gore to get in the money if he could first create sufficient
uncertainty about the legality of the method of counting votes and then
get that uncertainty to resolve itself in his favor. The criticism of the
events is not intended as personal criticism of Mr. Gore. One can hardly
blame someone for acting as economic theory predicts they should and
acting to exploit a free option. One thing is clear though, the dispute
was never about getting every vote counted, as Mr. Gore claimed in his
political rhetoric.' 7 ° Mr. Gore undermined his rhetoric in that respect by
initially seeking to throw out large numbers of absentee ballots, which
were known to favor Mr. Bush while seeking manual recounts only
selectively.'' But the idea that Mr. Gore only wanted to count every
165. Id. at 264.
166. Id. at 261.
167. Id. at 262 ("At issue is whether the absentee voting law requires absolute strict
compliance with all its provisions, or whether substantial compliance is sufficient to give validity
to the ballot.").
168. h. at 268.
169. Cf: Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1264 (Fla. 2000) (per curiarn) (Wells, C.J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted):
Historically, this Court has only been involved in elections when there have been
substantial allegations of fraud and then only upon a high threshold because 01" the
chill that a hovering judicial involvement can put on elections. This to me is the
import of this Court's decision in Boardman %'. Esteva.
170. f Sawyer & Lambrecht, supra note 56 (reporting on a lawyer who voted For Gore who
complained, "But the way Gore's lawyers are talking, it's starting to sound like unless you count
them the way Gore wants them to be counted, they haven't been counted").
171. See Richard Perez-Pena, Counting the Vote: The Absentee Ballots, N.Y. TitM.s, Nov. 20.
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vote was undermined even more by his position in court. Mr. Gore,
while publicly asserting that he wanted to count every vote and implying
that many votes were never counted, failed to take the position in court
that any ballots were never counted. 7 ' Every disputed ballot was
counted at least twice and tabulated as either being a vote for a candi-
date, a vote for no candidate (an undervote), or a vote for more than one
candidate (an overvote). 73 Mr. Gore's strategy was aimed solely at cre-
ating uncertainty, and hence value for his option with truncated losses
and potentially large gains, by focusing on emotional arguments that
undervotes from selected counties should be interpreted under the vague
intent of the voter standard rather than under the instructions that were
given to the voters.
The following facts are not in serious dispute. After the election on
November 6th, 2000, the results suggested razor-thin margins in several
states smaller than the error rate in vote tabulation. 74 The national pop-
ular vote margin was also razor thin, being reported around 0.0017%.'
Neither candidate received a majority of the popular vote.176 According
to the reported vote counts outside Florida, it appeared that the outcome
in the electoral college would be determined by the outcome in
Florida. 177
Voters who used punch card ballots were given the following
instructions: "AFTER VOTING, CHECK YOUR BALLOT CARD TO
BE SURE YOUR VOTING SELECTIONS ARE CLEARLY AND
CLEANLY PUNCHED AND THERE ARE NO CHIPS LEFT HANG-
ING ON THE BACK OF THE CARD."'78 After the election, the initial
results showed Mr. Bush to have 1,784 more votes than Mr. Gore out of
a total of approximately six million, a margin of 0.03%. 17 9 No party to
the election alleged in court that there were any ballots which were not
2000, at AI, available at 2000 WL 28283862 (reporting on the ticket's retreat from contesting
absentee ballots).
172. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 121 (2000) (per curiam) (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, & Thomas,
JJ., concurring).
173. Id.
174. David Westphal, A Divided Nation Waits, STAR-TRIBUNE (Minneapolis), Nov. 9, 2000, at
I A, available at 2000 WL 6996842.
175. Id.
176. B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., The 2000 Elections: The Pollsters, N.Y. TIMrS, Nov. 9, 2000, at
B2, available at 2000 WL 32001839.
177. Richard L. Berke & Alison Mitchell, Bush and Advisers, Confident of a Victory in
Recount, Urge Gore Not to Stand in Way, N.Y. TIMi-s, Nov. II, 2000, at Al, available at 2000
WL 32002360 (quoting House Representative minority leader Richard A. Gephardt stating,
"Florida is the obvious decider of this race").
178. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 119 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.., Scalia, & Thomas, JJ.,
concurring).
179. Id. at 100-01.
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counted. 8 ' No party to the election alleged in court that there was any
fraud in the election. 18' No party alleged that the counting equipment
malfunctioned. 
82
At this point, the events and dispute could be cast in a different
light by different people. One characterization of the events might be
that although it was known in advance that the election would be
close, 183 and that due to inadvertence some voters do not mark their
ballots carefully and mark their ballots in a way other than they
intended,' 84 or in a way which renders the ballots unreadable using the
machines, Mr. Gore's campaign chose not to say anything about the
matter until after the polls closed and the initial count was revealed. At
that point, Mr. Gore's campaign argued that the law could and should be
interpreted so as to remove legislative deadlines and remove discretion-
ary authority from the Secretary of State, local canvassing boards, and
trial judges. Also, the law should require hand examination of a subset
of ballots under standards differing from the voter instructions given,
and such a process might determine that more voters had intended to
vote for Mr. Gore than for Mr. Bush.
An alternative characterization of the events could be that Mr. Gore
believed it possible, and perhaps likely, that more people casting ballots
believed that they were voting for him than for Mr. Bush, but that tech-
nological problems with the counting equipment caused many ballots to
be tabulated as non-votes when looking at them could suggest otherwise.
Fairness to the voters and justice required that an opportunity be given to
attempt to discern whether more voters intended to vote for Mr. Gore
rather than relying on technical compliance with voting instructions
necessitated by counting equipment technology.
Before proceeding to more discussion of the law, it should be noted
that fairness, while being a principal that the law attempts to advance, is
not a legal argument.'85 Furthermore, fairness is a double-edged
sword.' 86 While it might be considered unfair not to count a vote merely
because a hole was not cleanly punched, it might also be considered
unfair to count the vote to those who took the care to punch the ballot
cleanly. If it is unfair not to count a vote in the way a voter intended,
180. Id. at 121 (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, & Thomas, JJ., concurring).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Bryan Smith, Bush or Gore: You Decide, Cm. SUN-TIMES, Nov. 7, 2000, at 1.
184. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 103 (per curiam).
185. Cf Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L. REV. 547, 549
(1970) (asserting that arguments based on fairness and morals are the refuge of the intellectually
bankrupt).
186. Cf. id. at 550-51 (giving an example of conduct regarded as fair for some and unfair for
others).
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then it might also be unfair not to count a vote from a voter on the way
to the polls, but who never made it due to unpredictable traffic, an acci-
dent, illness, and so on. Machine tabulation is fair in the sense that the
machine does not know who the ballot came from nor who the voter
intended to vote for, only how it is marked. The machine does not care
who wins and is therefore fully objective. Whatever alternative standard
is used, there is no standard which can consistently determine what
every voter intended because there is a wide variety of explanations for
undervotes. 187 The principle of objectivity and avoiding subjective
interpretations is usually desired in designing a fair method for grading
student exams. It is customary to grade a student on what he writes,
rather than on what the grader speculates the student intended to write.
If a student "knows" something on an exam, but phrases it incorrectly
and is downgraded for that, then the student might consider it unfair.
But if the grader decides that the student must have meant to write the
material correctly and scores the test as if it was written correctly, then
that might be considered unfair to other students. One is not likely to
get far with the bar examiners by arguing that on the multistate bar exam
the questions were marked correctly in the answer book, but transcribed
incorrectly on the sheet. The argument that the result is unfair would be
treated even less seriously if it was not raised until after learning that the
answers submitted were incorrect and the result was a failure.
The point of this argument is that fairness is a principle which
serves no constructive purpose in resolving the controversy presented by
a close election. There is no possible change in the status quo which
will universally, or even widely, be regarded as fair. The uncountable
number of "what ifs" will all result in a significant cry of unfairness.
B. The Cases
The number of cases and complexities are so great that one could
easily write a thousand pages on the topic in an effort to cover every
aspect of the case. In the interest of clarity and focusing on the most
important issues, this article confines discussion to limited elements of
four hearings and opinions. The two in the Supreme Court of Florida
resulting in opinions issued November 21, 2000, and December 8, 2000,
(hereinafter Gore 1188 and Gore 1/, 89 respectively), and the two in the
U.S. Supreme Court resulting in opinions issued December 4, 2000, and
187. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 103.
188. 772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam).
189. 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam).
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December 12, 2000 (hereinafter Bush 119' and Bush H,191 respectively).
1. GORE I
As referenced earlier, Florida law provides for the opportunity to
conduct manual recounts where there is "an error in the vote tabulation
which could affect the outcome of the election."'' 92 This language was
intended to apply to situations involving equipment failure or malfunc-
tion, 93 but Mr. Gore's campaign argued that the language covered the
alleged discrepancies between voter intent and machine tabulation.194 A
manual recount was then sought under this provision in three coun-
ties.' 95 Concerned that the recount could not be completed by the statu-
tory deadline for submitting returns, one county canvassing board sought
an advisory opinion from the State's Division of Elections regarding the
interpretation of the deadline. 196 The advisory opinion stated that absent
unforeseen circumstances, the returns either must be submitted by the
deadline or ignored.' 97 Relying on that opinion, Katherine Harris, Flor-
ida's Secretary of State, issued a statement that she would ignore manual
recounts submitted after the deadline. '" One of the county canvassing
boards then brought suit against Harris, and the candidates intervened.199
In the trial court, the judge ruled that the deadline was mandatory, but
that amended returns could be submitted afterwards.2 °° The judge fur-
ther ruled that acceptance of amended returns was within the discretion
of Harris, but that she could not exercise that discretion in an arbitrary
190. 531 U.S. 70 (2000) (per curiam).
191. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
192. FLA. STAT. ch. 102.166 (2000).
193. Cf Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 119 (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, & Thomas, JJ., concurring).
The Chief Justice wrote:
No reasonable person would call it "an error in the vote tabulation," ... when
electronic or electromechanical equipment performs precisely in the manner
designed, and fails to count those ballots that are not marked in the manner that
these voting instructions explicitly and prominently specify. The scheme that the
Florida Supreme Court's opinion attributes to the legislature is one in which
machines are required to be "capable of correctly counting votes," § 101.5606(4),
but which nonetheless regularly produces elections in which legal votes are
predictably not tabulated, so that in close elections manual recounts are regularly
required.
Id. (internal citation and footnote omitted).
194. See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1229 (Fla. 2000) (per
curiam).
195. Id. at 1225.
196. Id.
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manner.20 ' Harris then requested that those seeking to submit amended
returns provide letters stating the facts and circumstances which war-
ranted amending returns.202 Harris subsequently compared these letters
with specific criteria for determining whether amended returns should be
submitted, and announced that the facts and circumstances did not war-
rant amending returns after the statutory deadline. 0 3 She further
announced that she would certify the election results based on the previ-
ously submitted returns and absentee ballots upon completion of the
absentee ballot count.204 The Florida Supreme Court took jurisdiction of
the case before completion of the absentee ballot count and enjoined
Harris from certifying the election results until after a hearing.20 5
After briefs and oral arguments, the Florida Supreme Court dealt
with two issues of law. First, it dealt with the issue of whether the cir-
cumstances required for a manual recount under the statute applied.20 6
The court simply ruled that the plain language "error in the vote tabula-
tion which could affect the outcome" applied.20 7 The court then turned
to the more complex problem of resolving ambiguous provisions of the
statutory scheme which put the time frame for conducting a manual
recount in conflict with the plainly written deadline for submitting
returns.20 8 The court ultimately concluded that the conflicting language
relating to deadlines in the statute required the court to exercise its
power to fashion an equitable remedy, and the court extended the dead-
line for filing returns to November 26th-twelve days beyond the statu-
tory deadline. 209 The basis for the opinion was not entirely clear, but the
court appeared to emphasize the provision in the Florida Constitution
that places all political power in the hands of the people, and appeared to
emphasize prior judicial doctrine in local election disputes which holds
the "will of the people" to be dispositive. 21° The Florida Supreme Court
invoked its equitable power to fashion an appropriate remedy to create a
new deadline for submitting election returns, and ordered Harris to
accept such returns up to the new deadline.2 '
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1226-27.
204. Id. at 1227.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1228.
207. Id. at 1229.
208. Id. at 1231.
209. Id. at 1240.
210. Cf Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 78 (2000) (per curiam)
("[W]e are unclear as to the extent to which the Florida Supreme Court saw the Florida
Constitution as circumscribing the legislature's authority .... ").
211. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1240.
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2. BUSH I
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on two questions.212
The first question being whether the Florida Supreme Court's change in
the elector appointment procedures after election day constituted a viola-
tion of either due process or 3 U.S.C. § 5, the provision that provides a
safe harbor for congressional recognition of state electors.2 1 3 It is
important to note that the Supreme Court's opinion framed this question
in such a way as to indicate that there was no quibbling over whether the
Florida Supreme Court did in fact change the elector appointment proce-
dures. 214 The second question before the Court was whether or not the
Florida Supreme Court's decision changed the manner in which electors
are to be selected to a degree which would violate the legislature's
power under Art. II, § 1, cl. 2 of the U.S. Constitution.1 5
In a unanimous opinion, the Court briefly reviewed these issues and
noted several key facts. First, the Court noted that the Florida Supreme
Court had held under the plain meaning of Florida's code that a discrep-
ancy between a sample manual recount and machine recounts attributa-
ble to the manner in which ballots were punched or marked constituted
an "error in vote tabulation" that triggers statutory provisions for a full
manual recount.2 6 The Court also noted that the Florida court's invoca-
tion of its equitable powers to fashion a remedy including a newly cre-
ated deadline was based in part on a right to vote set forth in the state
constitution. 2 7 The Court also noted that while it will normally defer to
a state court on questions of state law, the law at issue in this case was
not based solely on power given to the legislature by the people of Flor-
ida, but by a direct grant of power in the U.S. Constitution.2t5 In
Blacker, the Court had previously held that power could not be circum-
scribed by the state.21 9
The Court expressed concern that the Florida court had reached its
decision without indicating whether it had considered limitations
imposed by the U.S. Constitution.22 ° It also observed that judicial con-
struction of Florida code potentially placing Florida's electors outside
212. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. at 73.
213. Id.
214. Id. (phrasing the question as, "[w]hether the decision of the Florida Supreme Court, by
effectively changing the State's elector appointment procedures after election day, violated the
Due Process Clause or 3 U.S.C. § 5.) (emphasis added).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 75.
217. Id. at 75-76.
218. Id. at 76.
219. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35-36 (1892) (quoting S. REP. No. 395 and stating that
this construction has prevailed too long to overturn).
220. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. at 77.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
the safe harbor of 3 U.S.C. § 5 would be ill-advised when the legislature
intended to receive the full advantage of that provision.22" '
After reviewing the Florida opinion, the High Court began its con-
clusion by quoting:
It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by
us in interpreting their state constitutions. But it is equally important
that ambiguous or obscure adjudications by state courts do not stand
as barriers to a determination by this Court of the validity under the
federal constitution of state action. Intelligent exercise of our appel-
late powers compels us to ask for the elimination of the obscurities
and ambiguities from the opinions in such cases.2 2
Finally, the Court held that there was considerable uncertainty
regarding the precise grounds on which the Florida opinion was based
and uncertainty as to whether the Florida Court interpreted the state con-
stitution to violate federal law (under Art. II or 3 U.S.C. § 5).223 There-
fore, the Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case.224
3. GORE II
The unanimity of the Florida Supreme Court in Gore I fractured in
Gore H with the Justices splitting four to three. Hints of a divide came
out at oral argument where the Chief Justice questioned whether the
court had any jurisdiction in light of the Blacker holding that the power
of the legislature to appoint electors is absolute, and further questioned
both parties' counsel as to why Blacker was not brought to the court's
attention in Gore 1.225 The Chief Justice also expressed skepticism
about the legality of a partial (and obviously cherry-picked, cream-skim-
ming) recount.226
The majority opinion, however, did not dwell on these issues. The
emphasis at that time had shifted from the "error in vote tabulation"
language in the code, governing recount provisions prior to certification,
to "rejection of legal votes" language in the code, governing provisions
for contesting certified results.22 7 Mr. Gore had brought a new suit in
the trial court to contest the certified results by this time.228 He sought
to compel completion of selected manual recounts that had stopped.229
221. Id. at 78.
222. Id. (quoting Minnesota v. Nat'l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940)).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. See Election 2000/Proceedings, Bos-iON GLOBE, Dec. 8, 2000, at A50, available at 2000
WL 3354862.
226. Id.
227. See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1253 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam).
228. Id. at 1247.
229. See id. (reversing the trial court order denying a manual recount in Miami-Dade County).
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The trial court held that it had to review the local canvassing boards'
actions under an abuse of discretion standard and found that they had not
abused their discretion.23 °
This time the majority opinion paid nominal service to federal law,
noting that the Court is mindful of the federal grant of authority to the
legislature.2 1 ' However, the majority did not provide a detailed analysis
directly discussing legal issues under the U.S. Constitution. Essentially,
the majority asserted that it was confining its decision to its interpreta-
tion of the state statute, and that the legislators who had enacted the
statute intended for the judiciary to have this role.2 32 For that reason
alone, one could certainly argue that this is a less than thorough analysis
of the federal questions.
The Court held that the trial court had applied incorrect standards in
both treating the local canvassing boards so deferentially and in requir-
ing a high burden of the plaintiff.233 In reaching its decision, the major-
ity focused on two elements of the code. The first being the phrase,
"rejection of a number of legal votes sufficient to place the results of the
election in doubt," and the second being the broad statutory grant to the
judiciary to fashion an "appropriate remedy. 234 While a reasonable
interpretation of the "rejection of legal votes" language is arguably that
it refers to situations in which legal ballots, most likely absentee, are
rejected without being counted, the Court interpreted rejection to mean
the counting of the ballots as "no vote. 235 In resolving this, the court
did not pay nearly as much attention to the interpretation of "rejection"
as it did to the interpretation of "legal vote. 2 36 In interpreting the
phrase "legal vote," the court again relied heavily on prior Florida cases
pertaining to local elections that held that when votes are counted manu-
ally, they must be tabulated in accordance with the intent of the voter
rather than technicalities.237
The majority, having interpreted ballots showing a visible indica-
tion of intent that were not machine recognized to constitute rejection of
legal votes, utilized the legislative grant to fashion appropriate relief to
230. Id. at 1252.
231. Id. at 1248.
232. See id. at 1249.
233. Id. at 1258-59.
234. Id. at 1253.
235. See id. at 1259.
236. See id. at 1256-57 (discussing the meaning of legal vote at length and finding that not
counting a legal vote constitutes a rejection, but not discussing whether counting a vote as a non-
vote constitutes a rejection).
237. See id.
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order manual recounts and their inclusion in the final vote count.238 No
direction as to how a person can determine intent was provided.239 The
majority ordered that the standards employed in determining what con-
stitutes a legal vote should be a "clear indication of the intent of the
voter," as referenced in Section 101.5614(5), Florida Statutes.24 °
The three most senior Justices dissented and wrote two opinions.2 4'
Chief Justice Wells joined in most of the opinion written by Justice
Shaw, but wrote his additional concerns in a separate opinion. 242 He
summarized his opinion as follows:
My succinct conclusion is that the majority's decision to return
this case to the circuit court for a count of the under-votes from either
Miami-Dade County or all counties has no foundation in the law of
Florida as it existed on November 7, 2000, or at any time until the
issuance of this opinion. The majority returns the case to the circuit
court for this partial recount of under-votes on the basis of unknown
or, at best, ambiguous standards with authority to obtain help from
others, the credentials, qualifications, and objectivity of whom are
totally unknown.243
The main thrust of Chief Justice Wells argument is that the trial
court must be sustained if there is any legal theory supporting the deci-
sion, and that there are more than enough such theories.244 An important
element he emphasized is that there is no common law right to contest
elections, and thus election contests must be governed strictly by the
statute, which he persuasively argues can only be reasonably interpreted
as giving much discretion in contests to local canvassing boards.245
According to the Chief Justice, the majority's opinion suggests that any
loser can get an additional recount in court simply by filing a contest
without any evidence, and the statute does not contemplate such a low
standard for judicial intervention, nor has the Court ever before used
such a low standard. 46 Chief Justice Wells also observed that "the trial
238. Id. at 1262; but cf id. at 1268 (Wells, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that no legal authority
exists to order partial recounts).
239. Id. at 1269 (Wells, C.J., dissenting).
240. Id. at 1262.
241. See id.
242. Id. at 1262-63 (Wells, C.J., dissenting).
243. Id. at 1263.
244. Id.
245. md. at 1268 ("The Legislature has given to the county canvassing boards-and only these
boards-the authority to ascertain the intent of the voter.").
246. Id. at 1266. Chief Justice Wells wrote:
Although it is unclear from case law what standard must be satisfied in order to
grant appropriate relief, it undoubtedly cannot be a low standard. Recently ... this
Court declined to invalidate an election despite a finding that the canvassing board
was grossly negligent and in substantial noncompliance with the absentee voting
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court expressly found no dishonesty, gross negligence, improper influ-
ence, coercion, or fraud .... *247 He further noted that the statutory
provision that the majority relied upon in asserting that legal votes are
votes where there is a clear indication of voter intent is a statute pertain-
ing to damaged, crumpled, or bent ballots.248
Chief Justice Wells additionally argued that the majority opinion,
besides construing Florida law incorrectly, was invalid under Article II
of the U.S. Constitution as well as the Equal Protection Clause because
the majority ordered only recounts of some non-votes and not others
(undervotes but not overvotes) and provided no uniform standards.249
Chief Justice Wells did not impugn the motives of the majority, but he
did suggest that it failed to understand the ramifications of its decision,
and that it failed to exercise appropriate restraint in attempting to reach
for what they believed to be right.""
Finally, in language supporting this article's argument that the pri-
mary purpose underlying elections is to reach a decision, Chief Justice
Wells stated:
This case has reached the point where finality must take prece-
dence over continued judicial process. I agree with the view attrib-
uted to John Allen Paulos, a professor of mathematics at Temple
University, who was quoted as saying "The margin of error in this
election is far greater than the margin of victory, no matter who
wins." Further judicial process will not change this self-evident fact
and will only result in confusion and disorder.25'
The other dissenting opinion argued to affirm the trial court on
somewhat narrower grounds-that Mr. Gore had failed to meet his bur-
den of proof.2 5 2 This analysis determines that the legislative code as it
applies to contests in statewide elections (all prior cases dealt strictly
statutes .... [M]erely stating the cause of action under the contest statute does not
entitle a party to a recount or require the court to set aside an election. More must
be required. This is especially true here, where . . . the trial judge found no
dishonesty, gross negligence, improper influence, coercion, or fraud in the balloting
and counting processes .... It is illogical to interpret section 102.168(3)(c) to set
such a low standard where a plaintiff merely has to allege a cause of action to
successfully carry the contest.
Id. (footnote omitted).
247. Id. at 1264 ("[T]he trial court expressly found no dishonesty, gross negligence, improper
influence, coercion, or fraud in the balloting and counting processes based upon the evidence
presented. I conclude this finding should curtail this Court's involvement in this election through
this case ....").
248. Id. at 1267.
249. Id. at 1269.
250. Id. at 1263.
251. Id. at 1270 (footnote omitted).
252. Id. (Harding & Shaw, JJ., dissenting).
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with local elections) can only mean a statewide contest rather than many
county contests. 5 Therefore, there is no legal basis for seeking
recounts on a subset of votes.2 54 Furthermore, Mr. Gore would need to
show that a statewide recount could change the outcome, something
which he had failed to do.2 55 This dissent also argued that selective
recounts would violate equal protection and have no basis in law.256
This second dissent further supported the argument by noting that a
statewide recount could not possibly be conducted in time and with
accuracy. 257 Florida law does not require futile acts or orders that are
impossible to execute.258 Such recounts would have no faith or
credibility.
259
In order to undertake this unprecedented task, the majority has estab-
lished standards for manual recounts-a step that this Court refused
to take in an earlier case, presumably because there was no authority
for such action and nothing in the record to guide the Court in setting
such standards. The same circumstances exist in this case.
260
Justice Harding expressed his strongest concern at the end of the dissent:
I am more concerned that the majority is departing from the essential
requirements of the law by providing a remedy which is impossible
to achieve and which will ultimately lead to chaos. In giving Judge
Sauls the direction to order a statewide recount, the majority permits
a remedy which was not prayed for, which is based upon a premise
for which there is no evidence, and which presents Judge Sauls with
directions to order entities (i.e., local canvassing boards) to conduct
recounts when they have not been served, have not been named as
parties, but, most importantly, have not had the opportunity to be
heard. In effect, the majority is allowing the results of the statewide
election to be determined by the manual recount in Miami-Dade
County because a statewide recount will be impossible to accomplish.
Even if by some miracle a portion of the statewide recount is com-
pleted by December 12, a partial recount is not acceptable. The
uncertainty of the outcome of this election will be greater under the
remedy afforded by the majority than the uncertainty that now
exists.
26 1




257. Id. at 1273.
258. Id. at 1272.
259. Id. at 1273.
260. Id. (footnote onitted).
261. Id.
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4. BUSH II
The U.S. Supreme Court issued an emergency stay of the recount
and scheduled a hearing.262 At oral argument, the Justices emphasized
the lack of uniform standards and equal protection.263 Justice O'Conner
wanted to know why some precise standard could not be set, such as that
given by the instructions on the ballot.2 64 Obviously, Mr. Gore would
not wish to have a recount under such a standard since it would likely
yield substantially the same result as the machine count.
In a per curiam opinion which apparently was joined by five of the
Justices, the Court reversed the Florida Supreme Court.26 5 The Court's
opinion begins with a summary of the case's history and states the ques-
tions before the court: "[W]hether the Florida Supreme Court estab-
lished new standards for resolving Presidential election contests, thereby
violating Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, of the United States Constitution and failing
to comply with 3 U.S.C. § 5, and whether the use of standardless manual
recounts violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. 266
The opinion then holds a violation of equal protection.267
Before sharing its equal protection analysis, the Court provided
some relevant background information-particularly the fact that two
percent of ballots cast nationwide do not register a vote for President for
a variety of reasons.268 While the microscope was on Florida, the issues
surrounding accuracy were not confined to Florida.269 The Court also
observed that individual citizens have no federal constitutional right to
vote for electors for the presidency unless and until the state legislature
chooses a statewide election as the means to implement its power to
appoint electors.270 When the state legislature chooses such a method,
equal protection must be given both in the apportionment and manner of
exercise.27 i
Without commenting as to whether the Florida Supreme Court had
the power under the legislative scheme to define a legal vote and order
262. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 100 (2000) (per curiam).
263. 'Where's the Federal Question?'; Justices Probe Both Sides for Key Issues, Standards
for Recounts, Remedies, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2000, at A36, available at 2000 WL 29920954
(quoting Justice O'Connor: "Why isn't the standard the one that voters are instructed to follow,
for goodness sakes'? I mean, it couldn't be clearer. I mean, why don't we go to that standard?").
264. See id.
265. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at I11.
266. Id. at 103.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. John Mintz & Dan Keating, A Racial Gap in Voided Votes, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 2000,
at Al (reporting that ballot tabulation rates have the greatest racial disparity in Illinois).
270. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 104.
271. Id. at 104-05.
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manual recounts implementing such definition, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the process in place did not satisfy the minimum requirement
for non-arbitrary treatment of voters necessary to secure the fundamental
right to equal protection.272 The court noted the unequal evaluation of
ballots in several respects.273 Only some ballots were ordered to be
recounted.274 No uniformity existed.275 Different counties utilized dif-
ferent standards.276 Within counties, different teams used different stan-
dards.27 7 Even a given team was noted to have used three different
standards for different ballots.
278
Relying on the Florida Supreme Court's finding that the legislature
intended the state's electors to obtain the safe harbor benefit of 3 U.S.C.
§ 5, requiring determination of the electors to be completed by Decem-
ber 12, 2000, and the obvious proposition that no statewide recount
meeting minimal equal protection standards could occur in the few
remaining hours, the majority effectively ordered an end to the
recounts.2 7 9 Two of the four dissenting opinions agreed that the Florida
court should be reversed on equal protection grounds, but disagreed that
the recounts should be halted.28" The two harsher dissents argued that
there was neither an equal protection concern nor any other federal ques-
tion warranting the Court's jurisdiction.28" ' The harsh rhetoric of these
two dissents seems particularly unfair in light of the unanimity behind
the opinion in Bush I, holding that potentially important federal ques-
tions could exist depending on the Florida Supreme Court's legal theory
underlying its decision, and the fact that the Florida Supreme Court
never properly addressed these concerns (except in dissenting opinions).
The dissenting Justices lacked cohesiveness. Justice Stevens's dis-
senting opinion-which contained highly publicized harsh criticism of
the majority 282-begins from the incredible position that state constitu-
272. Id.
273. Id. at 106.
274. Id. at 107-08.




279. Id. at I10.
280. See id. at I 1l.
281. Id. at 123 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The federal questions that ultimately emerged in this
case are not substantial."); see id. at 142 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
282. Justice Stevens's final passage in his dissent was widely quoted. It reads:
What must underlie petitioners' entire federal assault on the Florida election
procedures is an unstated lack of confidence in the impartiality and capacity of the
state judges who would make the critical decisions if the vote count were to
proceed. Otherwise, their position is wholly without merit. The endorsement of
that position by the majority of this Court can only lend credence to the most
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tions can constrain power expressly given to the state legislatures by
direct authority of the U.S. Constitution.283 Justices Souter and Breyer,
who agreed with the majority that the Florida Supreme Court's order
violated the Equal Protection Clause, but disagreed as to the remedy,
wrote dissents that were a bit more reasoned, if not more persuasive.
They viewed the Florida Supreme Court's decisions as mere interpreta-
tions of Florida statutes rather than as modifications of legislative intent,
and argued that the interpretations deserved deference since they were
among the set of plausible interpretations. 284 But they also found merit
in the argument that the process in place rose to the level of an equal
protection violation.285
Justice Ginsburg, on the other hand, simply characterized the
majority as overturning state law-she did not acknowledge the mixed
questions of federal and state law.286 Interestingly, Justice Ginsburg
criticizes the Chief Justice for using only three cases that support the
U.S. Supreme Court in overturning a state court's interpretation of state
law when it so radically changes prior existing law to constitute a denial
of due process, and noted that those cases involved state high courts of
the Jim Crow South. 87 Justice Ginsburg thought it unfair to bracket the
Florida Court with these other courts, but the argument can be turned
around. Claiming that the ends are just as a justification for any means
without legal foundation is obviously a tactic which is not confined to
the deplorable, but can be advanced by anyone feeling righteous when it
is convenient to do so. Justice Ginsburg provides little authority for her
opinion that no equal protection violation was created by the Florida
court. She expresses this conclusion in a single paragraph of her opin-
ion, basing it on her own notion of fairness, stating, "I cannot agree that
the recount adopted by the Florida court, flawed as it may be, would
yield a result any less fair or precise than the certification that preceded
that recount. ' 288 This, of course, misses the underlying purpose of the
cynical appraisal of the work of judges throughout the land. It is confidence in the
men and women who administer the judicial system that is the true backbone of the
rule of law. Time will one day heal the wound to that confidence that will be
inflicted by today's decision. One thing, however, is certain. Although we may
never know with complete certainty the identity of the winner of this year's
Presidential election, the identity of the loser is perfectly clear. It is the Nation's
confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of law.
ld. at 128-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
283. See id. at 123 ("[Article III does not create state legislatures out of whole cloth, but rather
takes them as they come-as creatures born of, and constrained by, their state constitutions.").
284. Id. at 131 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 149 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
285. Id. at 133-34 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 145-46 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
286. Id. at 135-36 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
287. Id. at 139-41.
288. Id. at 143.
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traditional presumption that certified returns are valid absent evidence of
fraud-to avoid pointless debate about which rules are the most fair
after the voting has taken place.
The concurring opinion, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, argued that additional grounds
beyond equal protection existed for reversing the Florida Supreme
Court. 89 The Chief Justice noted that, while state courts ordinarily
issue the definitive pronouncements of state law, the direct grant of
power to the state legislatures under Art. II, § 1, cl. 2 creates a situation
in which "the text of the election law itself, and not just its interpretation
by the courts of the states, takes on independent significance."29 He
then argued that the Florida Supreme Court deviated from the statutory
scheme in several material respects. 291 The statutory scheme gave dis-
cretion in certain matters to the Secretary of State and the local canvass-
ing boards which the Gore I opinion gutted.292 It also gave important
significance to the certified election results which Gore H stripped.293 It
also set deadlines and other institutional features which the court modi-
fied. 2 94 The Chief Justice was particularly critical of the interpretation
of rejection of a legal vote, arguing that, "Florida statutory law cannot
reasonably be thought to require the counting of improperly marked bal-
lots. ' 295 After observing that each polling place contains a working
model of a voting machine, and that each booth contains a sample ballot
with clear instructions, the concurrence argued,
No reasonable person would call it "an error in the vote tabula-
tion," . . . or a "rejection of legal votes," . . . when electronic or
electromechanical equipment performs precisely in the manner
designed, and fails to count those ballots that are not marked in the
manner that these voting instructions explicitly and prominently spec-
ify. The scheme that the Florida Supreme Court's opinion attributes
to the legislature is one in which machines are required to be "capa-
ble of correctly counting votes," ... but which nonetheless regularly
produces elections in which legal votes are predictably not tabulated,
so that in close elections manual recounts are regularly required.
This is of course absurd. The Secretary of State, who is authorized
by law to issue binding interpretations of the election code ...
rejected this peculiar reading of the statutes. . . . The Florida
Supreme Court, although it must defer to the Secretary's interpreta-
289. Id. at III (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, & Thomas, ii., concurring).
290. Id. at 113.
291. Id. at 117-22.
292. Id. at 116-18.
293. Id. at 116-17.
294. Id. at 117-18.
295. Id. at 118-19.
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The battle in Florida raises at least two important legal issues. First
is the question of whether the Florida court decided Florida law cor-
rectly. 29 7 The second is whether the Florida court paid appropriate
attention to constraints imposed by federal law. 298 During oral argu-
ments and in written opinions, several of the Supreme Court Justices,
including some of those ultimately dissenting from the final disposition
of the case, hinted that they felt the Florida court was wrong on Florida
law.2 99 Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion, joined by Justices
Scalia and Thomas, makes a compelling argument that the Florida
Supreme Court's interpretation of "error in vote tabulation" and "rejec-
tion of legal votes" language is absurd.3"' Also, the Florida Supreme
Court's modified deadline for filing returns was clearly pulled from thin
air by the court, raising a colorable claim of Article II and Due Process
violations.""
Normally, a state's highest court is the final arbiter of state law.3°2
State courts, however, are not the final arbiters of federal law and this
case clearly involved mixed questions of state and federal law.30 3 State
law is subordinate to federal law in areas enumerated in the U.S. Consti-
tution. 304 A state court is certainly free to construe state law in a manner
inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution, but of course it is then subject to
a federal court vacating its judgment. Because Article II explicitly
places the manner of selecting presidential electors in the hands of the
legislature, and since Blacker finds that the right is absolute and not
subject to modification by state constitutions, 305 it is unquestionable the
296. Id. at 119-20 (citations and footnote omitted).
297. Id. at 112 (noting that a Presidential election is one of those cases requiring an
independent analysis of state law).
298. See Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 73 (2000) (per curiam).
299. Bush v. Gore. 531 U.S. at 131 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that other interpretations of
Florida law might have been better); id. at 136 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("I might join the Chief
Justice were it my commission to interpret Florida law.").
300. Id. at 119 (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, & Thomas, J..., concurring). But see id. at 131
(Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 136 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Florida Supreme
Court's interpretation is within the set of viable alternatives).
301. See Bush v. Palm Beach Cotnty Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. at 75-76.
302. Id. at 76.
303. Id.
304. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
305. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. I, 35 (1892).
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Florida court's decision is reviewable.3"6 Where the legislature provides
for the selection of electors by popular vote and statute, it might be rea-
sonable for the judiciary to interpret the statute.3 °7 But clearly, the judi-
ciary cannot usurp the legislature's power and declare that it alone will
select the electors.3 "5  Nor can it declare that the governor will select the
electors. 3 9 Nor can it declare that the people will select the electors
without the legislature's consent, which the legislature can revoke at any
time. 3 "' Reasonable people can differ about where one crosses the line
between interpreting a statute and usurping legislative prerogative, but
no one can reasonably argue that the decision is not reviewable. Such a
position can only imply that states can evade constitutional limits by
simply asserting that they are interpreting pure state law matters. This
is, of course, inconsistent with fundamental principles of constitutional
law, 31 ' and the U.S. Supreme Court's two strongest dissenters' failure to
address this directly suggests that they were having difficulty coherently
expressing their legal analysis under the pressing time constraints.
Justice Stevens makes a weak attempt to address this argument in
his Bush II dissent by suggesting that Article II should be read to mean
that authority to select electors is given to the legislatures as they exist,
subject to constraints imposed on them by the states. 3 2 But this analysis
is incomplete. Could the state constitution permissibly strip the legisla-
ture of all authority and place it in the hands of the governor? Could the
courts, through power of judicial review and equitable remedies, usurp
all legislative efforts? The question is where the line between statutory
interpretation and judicial legislation is to be drawn, but Justice Stevens
cannot persuasively make the argument that there is no line to review.
Refusing to acknowledge the existence of a federal question and hiding
behind state sovereignty-an ironic position for this Justice 313-does lit-
306. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. at 78 (finding considerable
uncertainty as to how the Florida court handled federal questions).
307. See Gore v. Harris, 772, So. 2d 1243, 1248-49 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam).
308. Blacker, 146 U.S. at 34-35.
309. Id.
310. ld.
311. See, e.g., id. at 23 ("Where the validity of a statute of the state is drawn in question on the
ground that it is repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the United States, and the decision is in
favor of its validity, [the U.S. Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the judgment.]").
312. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 123 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
313. It is not difficult to find opinions authored by Justice Stevens in which he strongly asserts
the presence of a federal interest in matters of state sovereignty. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc.
v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568-72 (1996) (reversing the Alabama Supreme Court on a $2 million
punitive damage award as a violation of due process in part due to the federal interest in
facilitating interstate commerce through prohibitions on excessive punishment). Justices
Ginsburg, Scalia, and Thomas dissented from this opinion arguing that "Since the Constitution
does not make that concern any of our business, the Court's activities in this area are an
unjustified incursion into the province of state governments." Id. at 598. In response to Justice
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tie for the credibility of his legal analysis in this particular dissent. In
addition, his argument directly conflicts with Blacker.3t 4 Justice Ste-
vens does not address the question as to how his theory can be in accord
with Blacker and the historical authority on Article II cited within
Blacker.
The Florida Supreme Court's failure to discuss the limitations
under the U.S. Constitution, their insistence on hammering on the "will
of the people" language derived from the Florida Constitution, and their
reliance on previous judicial doctrine in the context of local elections
rather than relying exclusively on arguments of statutory construction
doomed them. Even more astonishing is the fact that the majority's
opinion in Gore H says little to address the issues raised in the U.S.
Supreme Court's remand and directions to clarify the legal grounds for
its first opinion. Indeed, one almost has to wonder whether the Florida
justices in the majority in Gore H read the Blacker case after the remand
issued in Bush I. In that case, the Court wrote the following:
The appointment of these electors is thus placed absolutely and
wholly with the legislatures of the several States. They may be cho-
sen by the legislature, or the legislature may provide that they shall
be elected by the people of the State at large, or in districts, as are
members of Congress, which was the case formerly in many States;
and it is, no doubt, competent for the legislature to authorize the gov-
ernor, or the Supreme Court of the State, or any other agent of its
will, to appoint these electors. This power is conferred upon the leg-
islatures of the States by the Constitution of the United States, and
cannot be taken from them or modified by their State constitutions
any more than can their power to elect Senators of the United States.
Whatever provisions may be made by statute, or by the state constitu-
tion, to choose electors by the people, there is no doubt of the right of
the legislature to resume the power at any time, for it can neither be
taken away nor abdicated. 3t 5
While the Court was quoting from a Senate report, it clearly agreed
with the language. Just four paragraphs later, Justice Fuller used his
own words to affirm the passage:
The question before us is not one of policy but of power, and
Ginsburg's concern that the Supreme Court is the only federal court policing punitive damage
awards, Justice Stevens wrote: "[T]his consideration surely does not justify an abdication of our
responsibility to enforce constitutional protections .... " 1d. at 586 n.4 1. Perhaps Justice Stevens
also fails Professor Dershowitz's "shoe on the other foot" test.
314. Compare Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 123 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that Article I1
takes legislatures subject to constraints imposed by state constitutions) with McPherson v.
Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892) (stating that the question is one of power, not policy, and the
power cannot be modified by state constitutions).
315. Blacker, 146 U.S. at 35 (quoting S. REP. No. 43-495).
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while public opinion had gradually brought all the States as matter of
fact to the pursuit of a uniform system of popular election by general
ticket, that fact does not tend to weaken the force of contemporane-
ous and long continued previous practice when and as different views
of expediency prevailed. The prescription of the written law cannot
be overthrown because the States have latterly exercised in a particu-
lar way a power which they might have exercised in some other way.
The construction to which we have referred has prevailed too long
and been too uniform to justify us in interpreting the language of the
Constitution as conveying any other meaning than that heretofore
ascribed, and it must be treated as decisive.
3 16
The present case was clearly a situation in which more authority
was in fact less authority. While arguably a wrong interpretation of
Florida law, if the majority of the Florida Supreme Court were to have
confined its opinion to statements involving statutory construction and
eliminated all reference to prior cases involving local elections, the will
of the people, and the Florida Constitution, it would have strengthened
its position. Still, even an attempt to confine the decisions as narrowly
as possible to the interpretation of state law would have left large obsta-
cles. The modification of the certification deadline done under the claim
of invoking equitable power to fashion an equitable remedy still created
a colorable due process claim." 7 Furthermore, the subsequent stripping
of the significance of certification in Gore II undermined the Florida
court's credibility."' The failure to address significant federal ques-
tions, including equal protection, gives the impression that the majority
was attempting to duck the issues.31 9
Mr. Gore had no federal claim. If the Florida courts had dismissed
his claim for failure to allege fraud and substantial irregularities, the
matter would have ended immediately. But by permitting and support-
ing Mr. Gore's challenge to the manner of counting votes, the standard
of counting votes, the kind and origin of the votes that should be
counted, and the time for counting votes, a number of federal questions
were raised which the U.S. Supreme Court had an obligation to hear."'
The per curiam and concurring opinions of Bush II are well-
grounded in controlling legal precedent and reasoned analysis. They are
316. Id. at 35-36.
317. See Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 75-76 (2000) (per curiam).
318. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 118 (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, & Thomas, JJ., concurring).
319. Gf Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1263 (Fla. 2000) (Wells, C.., dissenting) ("I also
believe that the majority's decision cannot withstand the scrutiny which will certainly
immediately follow Linder the United States Constitution.").
320. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at I ll ("When contending parties invoke the process of the
courts, however, it becomes our unsought responsibility to resolve the federal and constitutional
issues the judicial system has been forced to confront.").
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based on analysis of law, not emotion. While the disposition of the case
was consistent with this article's strong public policy argument in favor
of accepting an outcome and moving forward absent evidence of fraud,
the Court reached that result strictly within the confines of legal analy-
sis. As the concurring opinion asserts, the Florida Supreme Court
appeared to so substantially modify the statutory code while justifying
the modification on legal authority that was not controlling, that it
crossed the line of Article II's express grant to the legislature."' In
addition, as the majority of the Court concluded, the resulting process
did not meet minimally acceptable standards of equal protection.322
That process involved a count ordered by the state, in which some bal-
lots would be examined and others would not, depending on how the
machines interpreted them, and depending on where the ballots
originated.323 Those ballots that were examined would be interpreted
under possibly thousands of different standards varying according to the
speculative feelings of thousands of individuals at the moment of exami-
nation.324 Justice Breyer suggested that the originally certified results
also had equivalent equal protection concerns because their error rate
varied by the voting equipment used.3 25 The Equal Protection Clause,
however, does not guarantee equality, rather, it prevents states from act-
ing in an unequal manner towards its citizens.3 6 It should be obvious
that there is a substantial distinction between a state legislature allowing
local governments to choose their own voting equipment from amongst
a set of reasonable alternatives versus a state court mandating that local
governments conduct an unequal recount. The former does not violate
the Equal Protection Clause, but the latter does.327
321. Id. at 120 (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, & Thomas, JJ., concurring). As the Justices stated,
[I]n a Presidential election the clearly expressed intent of the legislature must
prevail. And there is no basis for reading the Florida statutes as requiring the
counting of' improperly marked ballots, as an examination of the Florida Supreme
Court's textual analysis shows.... [N]ever before the present election had a manual
recount been conducted on the basis of the contention that "undervotes" should have
been examined to determine voter intent.... For the court to step away from this
established practice ... was to depart from the legislative scheme.
Id. (citations omitted) (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, & Thomas, JJ., concurring).
322. See id. at I11.
323. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1264 n.26 (Wells, C.J., dissenting).
324. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 106 (per curiam).
325. Id. at 147 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
[lI]n a system that allows counties to use different types of voting systems, voters
already arrive at the polls with an unequal chance that their votes will be counted. I
do not see how the fact that this results from counties' selection of different voting
machines rather than a court order makes the outcome any more fair.
Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
326. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
327. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 109 (per curiam). The Court stated:
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In short, the fundamental question before the Court was one of
power, not policy-the Florida Supreme Court lacked the power to do
what it did. Furthermore, the Florida Supreme Court's actions were also
contrary to sound public policy.
B. Public Policy
Public choice is the application of economic analysis to the study of
politics.3"8 While the field has been dominated by economists, many
major contributions have come from individuals in other fields as
well.3"9 The field has also received a great deal of interest from philoso-
phers and ethicists. 33° One of the earliest problems addressed in public
choice relates to collective preferences.33' Where unanimity is required
to take action, action can be said to represent the will of the people.332
Of course, it is obvious that with large and heterogeneous societies, con-
siderable time would be required to reach decisions and some standard
short of unanimity is likely to be optimal.333 There is a rich literature
dealing with this topic that is readily accessible.
334
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, briefly discussed earlier, high-
lights the impossibility of creating a useful social aggregation procedure
that satisfies minimal properties (e.g., non-dictatorship). "When possi-
bility proofs appeared, they rested on such improbable conditions that
they underlined only the negative implications of Arrow's theorem. 335
This result is widely known within the legal literature. 336 An offshoot of
The question before the Court is not whether local entities, in the exercise of
their expertise, may develop different systems for implementing elections. Instead,
we are presented with a situation where a state court with the power to assure
uniformity has ordered a statewide recount with minimal procedural safeguards.
When a court orders a statewide remedy, there must be at least some assurance that
the rudimentary requirements of equal treatment and fundamental fairness are
satisfied.
Id.
328. See MUELLR, supra note 42, at I ("Public choice can be defined.as the economic study of
nonmarket decision making, or simply the application of economics to political science.").
329. See Mueller, supra note 77, at 3.
330. See MACKAY, supra note 14, at 3-5.
331. See id. at 1.
332. See Mueller, supra note 77, at 124.
333. See id. at 127 ("With a community of two, the unanimity rule would work fine; but with
larger communities and heterogeneous preferences for public goods, considerable time might be
required to reach a collective decision. Some fraction of the community falling short of full
unanimity is likely to he optimal .... ).
334. See generally PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE, supra note 77; MACKAY, supra note 14.
335. Mueller, supra note 77, at 5.
336. See, e.g.. Block, supra note 10, at 979-80 ("The existing legal literature now incorporates
extensive analysis of the voting paradox, its implications in a wide range ofjuridical contexts, and
it suggests some answers to the serious questions raised .... Citations to Arrow's work on social
choice have begun to appear in court opinions."); Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson,
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the literature that is more widely drawn on in law relates to the condi-
tions under which simple majority rule is an optimal procedure. Unfor-
tunately, as one would expect from Arrow's Theorem, when there are
more than two choices the conditions under which majority rule pro-
duces equilibrium are unreasonably restrictive. 7  The result is that
decisions become path dependent-determined by the manner in which
they are posed. A significant number of recent papers have focused on
path dependence in the law.33 The fact that preference aggregation
schemes cannot exist certainly explains election flip flops better than
changes in social attitudes.339
An important theorem related to majority rule is May's theorem.34 °
May's theorem demonstrates that if one starts with two constraints, the
voting system must be decisive and political equality (one person, one
vote) is required, then there is only one system that satisfies the con-
straints; that system is simple majority rule.34' That is not an endorse-
ment of majority rule, however, for two reasons. First, the theorem
implies that to impose any additional constraint, such as rationality in
the choices, there is no system that will satisfy the constraints.342 The
constraints are inherently inconsistent. Second, the concept of political
equality-one person, one vote-is very weak:
In thinking about political equality, one is always confronted by
something like a paradox. The standard problem for political equal-
ity is to strike a balance between conflicting views. If no deliberate
Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2124-25 (1990); Saul Levmore, Parliamentary Law, Majority
Decisionmaking, and the Voting Paradox, 75 VA. L. REV. 971, 985 (1989) ("The paradox is surely
one of the best known insights or topics in the social sciences."); Grant M. Hayden, Note, Some
hnplications of Arrow's Theorem for Voting Rights, 47 STAN. L. REV. 295, 297 (1995).
337. See Mueller, supra note 77, at 5-6. Professor Mueller states:
But the conditions under which majority rule produces an equilibrium with three or
more possible outcomes, or the restriction that there be only two possible outcomes,
seem so restrictive that many public choice scholars have not concluded that all
problems of preference aggregation can be solved by relying on the simple majority
rule to make collective decisions. For all its attractive properties, the majority rule
does not throw off the shadow cast by Arrow's theorem.
Id.
338. A LEXIS search on November 30, 2001, for law review articles within the past ten years
with "path-dependen!" as a keyword yielded 550 articles. Fourteen articles had the term in the
title. In the Spring of 1996, the Washington University Law Quarterly published a symposium
issue on "Path Dependence and Comparative Corporate Governance." See 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 317,
317 (1996).
339. See Tollison, supra note 92, at 340 ("To the extent that one can draw a positive principle
from Arrow, it is that democracy should yield capricious and unstable outcomes.").
340. See Douglas W. Rae & Eric Shickler, Majority Rule, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE,
supra note 77, at 163, 167.
341. See id. at 167.
342. See id. at 167-68.
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discrimination is built into the decision process, then either no choice
can be effected or such choices as are achieved must be deeply arbi-
trary.... In this primordial sense, any workable decision rule embod-
ies some seed of inequality. Decision itself is otherwise impossible,
and the test of decisiveness commits us to this fact.
343
Problems with majority rule have been more extensively investi-
gated than can be surveyed here. Suffice it to say that majority rule
raises serious issues about perpetuating political inequality344 and creat-
ing coalitions that use government to the disadvantage of society.345
This latter theme was popularized by Buchanon and Tullock, "and in
general Buchanan and Tullock have little good to say about the simple
majority rule."346 Of course our voting system is not one of majority
rule, and elections in which a plurality wins are even more difficult to
justify on the basis of their properties. 347 Referring to voting systems
generally, Professor Levmore wrote: "[I]t is pointless to ask the usual
question of whether the law is efficient or fair. The central message of
basic collective choice theory is, after all, that there will be some prob-
lem with every decisionmaking process. ' 34 8
A related strand of literature deals with the question of why people
vote. From a pure cost-benefit approach, voting is not rational. 349 It
costs something to vote, but the probability of the vote making a differ-
ence cannot reasonably be expected to outweigh even small costs associ-
ated with voting.35 ' Even with the most improbable election, such as the
election at issue, where a few hundred votes out of a hundred million
determined the election, no single vote changed the outcome. Scholars
have concluded that it is futile to attempt to develop a rational model of
voting based on influencing outcomes.35'
Instead, the more promising approach appears to be to view voting
as a consumption activity where voters are acting to express their opin-
ions."' This line of thought leads to three important points. First, if
343. Id. at 165.
344. See RIKER, supra note 16, at 233-34.
345. See BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 91, at 291-92 ("[lI]t is the opportunity to secure
differential benefits from collective activity that attracts the political 'profit-seeking' group.").
346. Mueller, supra note 77, at 7.
347. See MCLEAN, supra note 15, at 156 (explaining why plurality voting fails abysmally all
desirable criteria for voting systems).
348. Levmore, supra note 336, at 1044.
349. John H. Aldrich, When is it Rational to Vote?, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE, supra
note 77, at 373, 373-74 ("Akin to classic free riding, the chances of one vote affecting the
outcome are so minuscule that the instrumental value of turning out is essentially zero and hence a
rational actor would never vote.").
350. See id.
351. See id. at 389-90.
352. See id. at 390.
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voting is a symbolic act of consumption, it is difficult to argue seriously
that it results in a determination of the will of the people. This rein-
forces the idea that elections serve another purpose. Second, since vot-
ing is not an attempt to influence outcomes, this undermines any
argument that Nader voters would have voted for Gore. It is more likely
that Nader voters would have stayed home or written in a protest vote
than that they would have voted for Gore or Bush. Third, the majority
of people who are qualified to vote but do not can be presumed to feel
that the costs of expressing their opinion outweigh the satisfaction of
ceremonial voting. None of this supports the "will of the people"
construct.
What the public choice literature teaches us is the following. There
is no constitutional system for collectively determining social prefer-
ences that results in efficient and rational decisions and provides politi-
cal equality and decisiveness.353 It might be that we do not impose any
significant voter qualification requirements such as competence because
our real interest lies solely in the act of making decisions, not in the
decisions themselves. Making decisions that enable government to get
on to the business of governing is the only possible purpose elections
can serve. This, in turn, suggests that adhering to the long-standing, pre-
announced rules of the contest is a more important attribute than divin-
ing the will of the people.
Legal analysis utilizes numerous theoretical constructs to model the
world and analyze problems. The reasonable person, duty of ordinary
care, and fiduciary duties are but a few of these useful constructs.3 -4
The will of the people is not a useful construct-not because it does not
exist, but because it cannot exist. 355 It is a logical impossibility just as a
negative temperature in degrees Kelvin is, and therefore it is not con-
structive to incorporate it in law. If the will of the people were a mean-
ingful concept, the Florida Supreme Court's view-that the Florida
Legislature's scheme for selecting presidential electors is constrained by
their interpretation of Florida's state constitution-would merely be
unconstitutional under the U.S. Constitution's explicit and unambiguous
grant in Article II and the Supremacy Clause. But to subordinate legis-
lative power in this context to this construct makes for unsound public
353. See Levrnore, supra note 336, at 987-88.
354. See Mark Klock, Lighthouse or Hidden Reef? Navigating the Fiduciary Dutv of
Delaware Corporations' Directors in the Wake of Malone, 6 STAN. J. L. Bus. & FIN. I, 13-14
(2000) (describing models of fiduciary duty).
355. See, e.g., ARROW, SOCIAL Cuoici-, supra note 41, at 59; Pildes & Anderson, supra note
336, at 2138-39 (stating that the will of the people lacks meaning); TRIBE, su1pra note 85, § 1-8, at
12 n.6 (noting that Arrow's theorem suggests that there is no hope of meaningfully constructing
majority will).
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policy given that the construct makes no sense. A legal decision based
on it is certainly not persuasive and, arguably, not authoritative. The
will of the people is analogous to a minimum highway speed require-
ment of forty-five miles per hour combined with a maximum speed limit
of thirty miles per hour. Elections do not exist to determine the will of
the people. Elections serve as a socially acceptable method of allocating
political power in the absence of consensus in order to move forward.
If two football teams both want to receive the ball first at the start
of the game, it is pointless to let the team captains talk about who should
get the ball first. They flip a coin, not because that is the best way to
make the decision, but because there is no best way to make the decision
and the need to make a decision and proceed is more important than the
actual decision. Of course, a fair decision making process is preferred.
Before the flip, the teams could discuss whether it should be two out of
three flips or one flip. But after losing the flip in a single-flip contest, it
is counter-productive to begin negotiations about how many tosses
should occur. In the recent presidential election, the format of the bal-
lots, the instructions given to voters, and the method of tabulation were
all known in advance. To allow one party to litigate these issues absent
a showing of fraud in the hopes of reaching a better decision is worse
than pointless. It gives the losing party an out-of-the-money option and
creates a moral hazard problem where it is in the party's interest to max-
imize political risk and legal uncertainty contrary to the interests of
society.
Certain Florida courts should be criticized on three counts. First,
for their failure to interpret the legislative scheme in the appropriate con-
text. Second, for their failure to stay within the bounds imposed by the
U.S. Constitution. Finally, for their failure to understand that the public
interest is hurt, with no offsetting benefits, by permitting the type of
litigation that occurred to move forward absent a showing of fraud.
The criticism of the U.S. Supreme Court majority as deciding the
case on political ideology, on the other hand, is unconstructive. It is an
untestable proposition, and merely unsubstantiated mudslinging. The
fact that the more "conservative" Justices' decision worked to the favor
of the more "conservative" candidate does not support the causal infer-
ence that critics seek to establish." 6 Their decision was the best one not
356. There is a certain amount of hypocrisy in the popular media that results in public
allegations of partisanship whenever a difficult case ends in the "conservative" result supported by
the "conservative" Justices. Cf Jeff Jacoby, Slander Is Just Fine When the Left Does It, BOSTON
GLOBE, Dec. 28, 2000, at A I5, available at 2000 WL 3357234 (documenting numerous cases of
anticonservative hate speech in the media without uproar, e.g., a call for snipers juxtaposed with
pictures of Mr. Bush, comparisons between Republicans and Nazis, etc., when seemingly less
outrageous speech by conservatives resulted in large outcries and publicity).
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because of which candidate benefitted, but because of better legal
analysis.
Undoubtedly, there will be talk of making elections more uniform
and accurate, but there is a cost. There will always be some margin of
error, but that margin of error can always be reduced at a cost. If two
candidates are so close that only incredibly expensive technology can
discern the difference, perhaps the choice between the two is not that
important. Arrow's work suggests that flipping a coin in such cases
would be no more arbitrary than counting votes.
Not only are all counts subject to error, but all statutes are subject
to interpretation. While I do not subscribe to the view that no statute can
be perfectly clear in a given situation, it is also the case that no written
rule can be perfectly clear in all situations either.357 This is why litiga-
tion occurs with respect to contracts, bond covenants, and the like.
Appellate opinions clearly show that litigation is not limited to disputes
over facts, but often involves disputes over rules. Rules that were
intended to be clear, and for which there were strong economic incen-
tives to make clear, nevertheless end up being litigated. This is why we
need a judicial policy of restraint refusing to interpret ambiguous elec-
tion statutes and reinforcing the presumptive validity of certified elec-
tion winners absent evidence of fraud. Otherwise, we will have a flood
of judicial involvement in elections." 8 Public policy arguments suggest
that society benefits most from certain results rather than unresolvable
deliberation. Instead of doing the best bad job possible in interpreting
an ambiguous election statute, the courts should declare such statutes
undecipherable and find in favor of the status quo, extinguishing these
free out-of-the-money options and the accompanying moral hazard.
It has been established in the literature of ethics, political science,
sociology, and public choice that voting does not fulfill the purpose of
ranking socially preferred choices. Therefore, the purpose of voting
357. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 34-35 (1991) (discussing the fact that corporate contracts necessarily leave some
matters open).
358. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1264 (Fla. 2000) (Wells, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice
Wells wrote of the majority decision:
[W]e run a great risk that every election will result in judicial testing. Judicial
restraint in respect to elections is absolutely necessary because the health of our
democracy depends on elections being decided by voters-not by judges. We must
have the self-discipline not to become embroiled in political contests whenever a
judicial majority subjectively concludes to do so because the majority perceives it is
"the right thing to do." Elections involve the other branches of government. A lack
of self-discipline in being involved in elections, especially by a court of last resort,
always has the potential of leading to a crisis with the other branches of government
and raises serious separation-of-powers concerns.
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seems most likely to further the goal of effecting a socially acceptable
decision about who will govern in order to move on with the business of
government. This resolution requires a bright-line rule rather than an
invisible marker. What is the bright-line rule? It is not selection of the
individual most desired by the people (which might not even be
defined). It is not the selection of the person that most registered voters
desire, nor is it the selection of the least objectionable person. It is not
the selection of the person most voters wish to vote for, nor is it the
selection of the person most voters intended to vote for. The rule that
we have traditionally utilized in elections is that the individual who wins
the election is the candidate who receives more votes than any other
candidate, as tabulated by properly functioning voting equipment.
The fact that the Florida legislature was prepared to exercise its
plenary power to send electors to Congress, and that Mr. Gore's team
was working on a strategy to challenge those electors, 359 reaffirms Mr.
Gore's lack of credibility when he asserted that his contest was not about
winning the presidency, but about the fundamental principle of counting
every vote. 360 Mr. Gore's politically charged taxonomy of classifying
twice counted undervotes as votes which were never counted was
designed to enhance his option value. Note, though, that while Mr. Gore
repeatedly took the public position that thousands of votes were "never
counted," he never made such a representation in legal proceedings
because, in fact, every disputed ballot was counted at least twice-
36'
just not the way Mr. Gore wanted them counted. 62
After the election was over, Mr. Gore found himself in a no-lose
situation in which he could possibly emerge victorious by creating
uncertainty over the question, "which rule is the law?" Mr. Gore pro-
posed a new rule which would require subjective examination of ballots
in a few geographic areas which were tabulated as voting for no presi-
dential candidate to infer for whom the voter intended to vote.36 3 Mr.
359. See Jonathan Turley, Commentar,: The Scariest Part Mal, Be Yet to Come, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 8, 2000, at B9, available at 2000 WL 25925903 (reporting on Gore efforts to challenge an
alternative slate of electors).
360. See Counting the Vote: Christopher Comments on Recount in Florida, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
12, 2000, § 1, at 23.
361. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 121 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, & Thomas, JJ.,
concurring) ("[N]o one claims that these ballots have not previously been tabulated; they were
initially read by voting machines at the time of the election, and thereafter reread by virtue of
Florida's automatic recount provision.").
362. See Sawyer & Lambrecht, supra note 56 (reporting on a lawyer who voted for Gore who
complained, "But the way Gore's lawyers are talking, it's starting to sound like unless you count
them the way Gore wants them to be counted, they haven't been counted.").
363. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1226 (Fla. 2000) (per
curiam) (indicating that Mr. Gore was allowed to intervene on behalf of selected counties seeking
to conduct manual recounts and submit returns after the statutory deadline).
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Gore also, at least implicitly, supported efforts to allow voters who
voted for third party candidates or for "none of the above" to change
their vote after the election.364 These are not surprising proposals from
an election loser, but they fly in the face of voting's objective-quick
resolution of disagreement over who should have political power. For
that reason, proposals to count subjectively, to count differently, to do
the election over-should be summarily rejected when they are raised ex
post.
Mr. Gore could have enhanced his credibility greatly if he had
made his arguments when he was free of the moral hazard problem.
Prior to the election, Mr. Gore could have publicly stated that he felt
butterfly ballots were confusing and ballots that are cast for third party
candidates or blanks should be examined to determine intent. He could
have publicly stated that if the number of votes given to third party can-
didates exceeded the difference between the two major candidates, then
a revote should take place. He could have publicly stated that since
problems exist with punch cards, any ballots counted by the machines as
non-votes should be examined to determine voter intent. Since he did
not raise these issues before the election, optimal social policies-quick
and definitive resolution of political power plus placing the costs of risk
on those who create it-demands that he not be permitted to raise them
after the election.
V. CONCLUSION
The will of the people is an internally inconsistent concept that can-
not exist. The logic of Arrow cannot be broken. It is a fact that no
democratic system of voting can be constructed that will result in consis-
tent choices. Democracy is inherently irrational, yet we embrace it. If
there is to be an explanation for this it must be that we embrace democ-
racy, not because of the efficiency of the decisions in which it results,
but because of the efficiency it provides in achieving decisions. The
point of an election is to come quickly to a resolution. 365 Permitting a
364. Many argued that the courts had and should have used their broad power to order a new
election in Palm Beach County. See David G. Savage & Henry Weinstein, Decision 2000/
America Waits: Florida Judges Have Power to Upset Elections, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2000, at
Al, available at 2000 WL 25916569 (reporting on calls for a revote in a special election).
365. Cf WIs. STAT. ANN. § 5.01(4) (2001) (providing that election ties be settled by drawing
lots); Robert E. Pierre, Where Elections Depend On the Luck of the Draw: In Wis. Communities,
Ties Are Settled by Chance, WASH. POST, Apr. 22, 2002, at A03, available at 2002 WL 19155580.
As evidenced by the 2000 presidential race, disputes in close elections can linger on,
cost lots of money and dissolve into nasty finger-pointing arguments .... In this
spring's round of county board elections, there were several ties .... Each was
settled by long-established rules in the Wisconsin election code: The contenders
drew names, cut cards, flipped coins or drew straws.
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losing candidate to litigate over the rules of the election such as a dead-
line for counting ballots, the meaning of "error in vote tabulation," the
meaning of "rejection of legal votes," and the standards employed for
counting the votes-after the election has been completed and the votes
counted-destroys the underlying social purpose of an election. Fur-
thermore, it creates a moral hazard problem whereby the losing candi-
date's incentive is to maximize political and legal uncertainty,
uncertainty that can adversely affect other important aspects of society.
Judges are supposed to operate according to law independent of
external pressure. No allegations of fraud were made. No allegations
that ballots were rejected were made. No allegations that counting
equipment malfunctioned were made. The election may have been
imperfect, but it was fair. The Florida courts should have dismissed the
case for failure to state a claim because there was no basis in Florida law
for extending the deadline, and no fraud to warrant the creation of new
law. The Florida Supreme Court should not have invoked equitable
power to change the election procedure and reverse the trial courts,
much less order the peculiar relief it did. While the U.S. Supreme Court
ultimately restored the status quo on legal grounds, this never should
have gone so far. The election served to highlight technological issues
related to vote tabulation and will potentially reduce the chances of
another election being decided by less than the margin of error in the
near future. Hopefully, more dialogue about the philosophical purpose
that voting serves will also foster greater judicial restraint when a similar
election contest next occurs.
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